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Institutional Design and the 
Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist 
Separation of Powers Ideals 
in the States 
Jim Rossi 52 Vand. L. Rev. 1167 (1999) 
This Article applies comparative institutional analysis to sepa-
ration of powers under state constitutions, with a particular focus on 
the nondelegation doctrine and states' acceptance of Chadha-like re-
strictions on legislative oversight. The Article begins by contrasting 
state and federal doctrine and enforcement levels in each of these sepa-
ration of powers contexts. Most state courts, unlike their federal coun-
terparts, adhere to a strong nondelegation doctrine. In addition, many 
states accept (de facto if not de jure) even more explicit and sweeping 
legislative vetoes than the federal system. The Article highlights the 
contrast of federal and state approaches by identifying their similarity 
with Federalist and Antifederalist separation of powers principles, 
respectively. 
Once the contrast is drawn, the Article develops a descriptive 
explanation for this divergence in jurisprudential approach. After 
discussing the pitfalls of common American heritage, textual, and 
culture-based approaches to interpreting separation of powers in state 
constitutionalism, the Article presents institutional analysis as a better 
explanation for divergences in interpretive approach. Specifically, the 
Article discusses institutional design in the legislative and executive 
branches of states, and its interrelationship with faction and capture of 
the agency decisionmaking process. Attention to institutional design 
can explain adherence to the nondelegation doctrine in many states, 
and can also explain the explicit and sweeping presence of legislative 
vetoes in some states. In addition, attention to institutional design 
features and their interrelationship with faction in the decisionmaking 
process can help to shed light on doctrinal nuances of state court ap-
proaches to upholding and striking certain delegations, such as delega-
tions to private boards and to federal agencies. Thus, an appreciation 
of the role of institutional design is a necessary predicate to the devel-
opment of an independent state theory of separation of powers. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In confronting important constitutional issues, state courts 
face a range of interpretive questions, many unanswered by the texts 
of state constitutions. Where a constitutional text fails to answer the 
question posed, a state court, much like its federal counterparts, 1 
must look to extra-textual interpretive tools to aid in its decision-
making task. The literature on state constitutional law provides im-
portant insights into how interpretation operates within a single 
state's. system of governance.2 But rarely does it attempt to under-
1. See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991); RONALD 
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986). 
2. Often this occurs in centennial symposia celebrating state constitutions. See generally 
Gordon B. Baldwin, Celebrating Wisconsin$ Constitution 150 Years Later, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 661 
(introducing symposium issue). 
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stand and appreciate how or why the interpretive practices of state 
and federal constitutional systems differ. 
This is unfortunate. Understood through the lens of a com-
parative method, state constitutional law takes on a new level of rich-
ness. Of course, many have argued that state constitutions are 
unique and that state constitutional interpretation ought to adjust to 
the "character" of the people of a state or region, suggesting a variety 
of distinct interpretive approaches between the states. 3 Apart from 
this argument, suggested by many advocates of the new judicial fed-
eralism, 4 there is little discussion of state courts' divergence in result 
from federal courts in deciding similar constitutional issues. 
In fact, in contrast-and perhaps in reaction-to character-
based interpretive arguments, some have suggested that state courts 
seek out common American values, disregarding or discounting pecu-
liar features of their own systems of governance. 5 According to Paul 
Kahn, efforts of state courts to ground constitutional interpretation in 
"unique state sources," whether textual or attitudinal, is anachronis-
tic, because Americans identify with a national community and share 
fundamental values.6 James Gardner, a consistent critic of the new 
judicial federalism, also endorses a notion of national unity in state 
constitutional interpretation. Gardner argues that a state court 
should "part company with the United States Supreme Court for no 
3. For example, Robert Post writes that "[c]onstitutional law is fundamental because it 
reflects and embodies the essential political ethos that makes governance possible within a 
particular culture." Robert C. Post, The Challenge of State Constitutions, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
REFORM IN CALIFORNIA: MAKING STATE GOVERNMENT MORE EFFECTIVE AND RESPONSIVE 45, 45 
(Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll eds., 1995). See also A.E. Dick Howard, State Courts and 
Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873, 938-39 (1976) (noting 
state constitution is a "mirror of fundamental values"). The judges and justices sitting on their 
state's highest courts frequently claim that their constitutions reflect unique values. See, e.g., 
Shirley S. Abrahamson, Reincarnation of State Courts, 36 SW. L.J. 951, 965 (1982) (Wisconsin 
Supreme Court Justice, lecturing that a state constitution should be interpreted in light of its 
"peculiarities," including "its land, its industry, its people, [and] its history"); Judith S. Kaye, 
Dual Constitutionalism in Practice and Principle, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 399, 423 (1987) (Associ-
ate Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, observing that "[m]any states today espouse 
cultural values distinctively their own"); Robert F. Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal 
System: Perspectives on State Constitutions and the Washington Declaration of Rights, in 
DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 239, 244 (Bradley D. McGraw ed., 1985) (Associ· 
ate Justice of the Washington Supreme Court, arguing that his state's constitution should be 
interpreted in light of "the vast differences in culture, politics, experience, education and 
economic status" between the state and national founding periods). 
4. For discussion and criticism, see James A. Gardner, Southern Character, Confederate 
Nationalism, and the Interpretation of State Constitutions: A Case Study in Constitutional 
Argument, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1219, 1227 (1998) (concluding that "the character differentiation 
hypothesis does not hold up'). 
5. See id.; infra note 6. 
6. Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. 
REV. 1147, 1159-60 (1993). 
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other reason than, in the state court's view, the Supreme Court has 
gotten it wrong."7 
Yet, it should come as no surprise that, in practice, a lockstep 
approach is rarely followed. State courts sometimes reach different 
results than their federal counterparts in deciding issues of constitu-
tional law because states are distinct institutions of governance, in 
terms of their sizes, decisionmaking structures, populations, and his-
tories. In recent years, institutional features of governance have re-
ceived much attention in a growing literature known as "comparative 
institutional analysis."8 Unlike character-based approaches to com-
parative state constitutionalism, which view constitutional interpre-
tation as each state's attempt to identify the ethos of its polity, an in-
stitutional approach attempts to develop general observations about 
how governmental structures influence or demand distinct ap-
proaches to constitutional interpretation. A comparative institutional 
explanation of constitutional difference begins from the assumption 
that structural differences affecting constitutional interpretation 
outweigh structural similarities, and that these institutional differ-
ences provide a better explanation for diverging interpretive ap-
proaches than differences in culture or region. 9 
In this Article I set out to explore how, if at all, institutional 
analysis ·can shed light on state constitutional interpretive practice 
and the understanding of state constitutional law. I focus my inquiry 
on one particular jurisprudential aspect of state constitutions-sepa-
ration of powers-but the analysis has implications for other constitu-
tional issues. Separation of powers is a broad set of democratic prin-
ciples. These principles find expression in a variety of jurisprudential 
doctrines, 10 but two particular doctrines have greatly influenced the 
7. Gardner, supra note 4, at 1289. 
8. See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN 
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994) (advocating increased role for comparative institu-
tional analysis in law); see also Neil K. Komesar, Exploring the Darkness: Law, Economics, and 
Institutional Choice, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 465. In legal analysis, comparative institutional analy-
sis has perhaps been most fully explored in the context of international law. See generally 
William J. Aceves, Institutionalist Theory and International Legal Scholarship, 12 AM. U. J. 
INT'L L. & POL'Y 227 (1997); Joel P. Trachtman, The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of the 
International Economic Organization: Toward Comparative Institutional Analysis, 17 NW. J. 
INT'LL. & Bus. 470 (1996-97). 
9. The approach is similar to Dan Rodriguez's recent call for a "trans-state" constitution-
alism, in which constitutional issues are not jurisdiction-specific but "raise similar stakes and 
have more or less similar shapes." Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutional Theory and its 
Prospects, 28 N.M. L. REV. 271, 301 (1998). 
10. Some of these doctrines inform the power and limits of the judiciary. See, e.g., Lea 
Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article Ill: Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy" Require-
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power of agencies to promulgate rules and to take other regulatory 
action: (1) the nondelegation doctrine, which places limits on the 
ability of a legislative body to delegate decisionmaking authority to an 
agency; and (2) limitations on legislative oversight by the exercise of 
unilateral actions that trump agency decisions absent some executive 
acquiescence. 
Part II of this Article introduces the approach of federal courts 
in deciding separation of powers matters. In the federal system, post-
New Deal separation of powers jurisprudence has recognized the rele-
vance of these doctrines but supports different enforcement levels for 
each. Federal courts have weakly enforced the nondelegation doctrine 
by applying something similar to the test endorsed in the 1960s by 
Kenneth Culp Davis. Davis urged courts to accept a delegation of 
power made with a vague ''intelligible principle" so long as adequate 
"procedural safeguards'' are in place.11 At the same time, at least 
since the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in INS v. Chadha, 12 limits on 
unilateral legislative trumps on executive exercises of delegated 
power, such as the legislative veto, have been strongly enforced by 
federal courts. When these two aspects of separation of powers are 
considered together, our federal system might be said to endorse a 
strong prodelegation separation of powers jurisprudence- one that 
generally favors delegation to administrative agencies, while pre-
cluding congressional delegation with strings attached. 
The founders of our Constitution could not possibly have envi-
sioned the scope and size of the modern administrative state. Yet, I 
shall argue, the prodelegation position shares some intellectual prin-
ciples with the Federalist political science of the founding era, which 
recognized separation of powers but favored a blended or mixed con-
ception of separation of powers over a more rigid interpretation that 
was popular in state constitutions at the time. 
Some states decide these issues in a manner almost identical 
to federal courts, but many state courts approach separation of pow-
ment, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 302-06 (1979); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit 
the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1365 (1953); 
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 
CORNELL L. REV. 393, 413-15 (1996); Lawrence Gene Sager, Constitutional Limitations on 
Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 37-
42 (1981); Herbert Weschler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001 (1965). 
Separation of powers with respect to the judiciary is beyond the scope of my inquiry. 
11. See Kenneth Culp Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 713, 725 
(1969) (suggesting that "the exclusive focus on standards should be shifted to an emphasis more 
on safeguards than on standards''). 
12. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
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ers jurisprudence differently. In Part III, I argue that the approaches 
of many states have origins in Antifederalist political thought and the 
early constitutions of the colonies.13 Modern state courts take a vari-
ety of approaches, but most state courts reject Davis' view of separa-
tion of powers. In many states, courts impose substantive limits on 
delegation. Legislatures are not allowed to delegate to agencies un-
less they have articulated reviewable standards to guide agency dis-
cretion, even where procedural safeguards are in place. At the same 
time, many states accept a legislative oversight role for agency rule-
making not allowed Congress. In some states, legislative veto or 
oversight committee suspension of rules is constitutionally author-
ized; in others, the state legislature or legislative committees are 
given far broader oversight roles-either de jure or de facto-with re-
spect to agency rulemaking than the U.S. Congress. This contrasts 
with the federal approach to the extent it disfavors agency exercise of 
discretion absent some explicit acquiescence by the legislature, either 
in more specific acts of delegation or in legislative approval of admin-
istrative rules. 14 Like Antifederalist political science, many states, 
more than federal courts, view separation of powers as requiring com-
plete separation of functions and most states see the legislature as 
the supreme lawmaker. The prodelegation approach and Chadha's 
prohibition on the legislative veto, endorsed by federal courts, is in-
consistent with some Antifederalist separation of powers principles. 
In Part IV of the Article, I apply theories of state constitutional 
interpretation to the separation of powers issue with the intention of 
identifying an independent state theory of separation of powers; one 
that might explain why Antifederalist separation of powers ideals lin-
ger in the states. While my analysis provides some explanation for 
13. In contrasting Federalist and Antifederalist political thought, I am focusing on their 
understandings of separation of powers and its applications to the relationship between legisla-
tures and executives, not on their differing views of the powers of a central government vis-a-vis 
the states. Although the powers of a central government and its impacts on individual rights 
were clearly a concern to the Antifederalists, see generally JACKSON TURNER MAIN, THE 
ANTIFEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF THE CONSTITUTION 1781-1788 (1961), separation of powers was 
also an important concern in their political philosophy. Gordon Wood observes that, because 
many had come to view separation of powers "as an essential precaution in favor of liberty ... it 
was perhaps inevitable that the Antifederalists would invoke the notion of separation of powers 
in opposition to the Constitution." GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 549 (1969). 
14. By developing an anti-delegation separation of powers paradigm, 1 do not intend to 
suggest that this idea is in fashion among all or even most of the states. Rather, by highlighting 
the extreme position, endorsed in a few states, I only intend to illustrate the contrast between 
the federal and many states' approaches for purposes of developing an explanation for state 
approaches. 
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the approach of many state courts, I do not intend to defend or justify 
Antifederalist separation of powers ideals. Instead, my observations 
are directed to the reasoning-not the result-of state court opinions. 
Regardless of result, state courts rarely make explicit the Antifeder-
alist principles behind their decisions, nor do they point to the institu-
tional features that might explain their decisions. Instead, they at-
tempt to ground their interpretive decisions in common American 
heritage or textual arguments. In doing so, state courts ignore or 
bury in doctrinal subterfuge the micropolitical factors that influence 
their doctrinal approaches. 
An appreciation of the institutional design of state systems of 
administrative governance provides insight as to how state courts 
should seek out certain values-particularly values associated with 
sound institutional governance-in performing their interpretive task. 
Specifically, as I suggest, key institutional differences between state 
legislatures and the United States Congress, as well as some differ-
ences between the structure of executive governance between the 
states and the President of the United States, may have worked to 
perpetuate Antifederalist principles in state separation of powers 
jurisprudence.15 The role of institutional design factors should not be 
exaggerated, but some attention to institutional design helps to shed 
light on state courts' interpretive approach in adhering to Antifeder-
alist separation of powers ideals.16 While there are normative 
grounds for critiquing the interpretive approach of state courts in 
addressing separation of powers issues, especially when compared to 
15. I am not making a causal historical claim. The institutional design features I discuss 
do not have Antifederalist origins. Rather, I intend to argue that contemporary institutional 
design, whatever its historical origins, seems to perpetuate Antifederalist ideals. State constitu-
tion institutional design typically has more recent origins. 
16. The contribution of institutional factors to separation of powers jurisprudence has 
been discussed in more particularized separation of powers contexts. See Harold H. Bruff, 
Separation of Powers Under the Texas Constitution, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1337, 1346 (1990) (arguing 
that "the strength and nature of the relationships between agencies and the constitutional 
branches" are important to understanding Texas' separation of powers jurisprudence, and that 
"the differences between federal and state governments may prove important to the analysis"); 
John Devlin, Toward a State Constitutional Analysis of Allocation of Powers: Legislators and 
Legislative Appointees Performing Administrative Functions, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1205, 1211 (1993) 
(observing "there are systematic differences between the federal government and the states with 
respect to their constitutions and their place in the American scheme of government, and that 
these differences make the development of an independent theory of state constitutional alloca-
tion of governmental powers both possible and desirable"). This Article generalizes and devel-
ops further some of Bruff and Devlin's insights, utilizing the more comprehensive method of 
comparative institutional analysis. For a recent discussion of how comparative institutional 
competence affects the application of rationality review in state courts, see Helen Hershkoff, 
Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. 
REV. 1131 (1999). 
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the approach of federal courts, a careful analysis of institutional dif-
ference is necessary to understand why Antifederalist ideals continue 
to surface in many states. In addition, institutional design factors 
help us understand why state courts strike or uphold various delega-
tions, and why states accept more formalized oversight roles for leg-
islatures than their federal counterparts. In deciding separation of 
powers issues, state courts seeking an independent justification for 
their decisions should make explicit Antifederalist separation of pow-
ers principles and discuss the institutional features in their own sys-
tems of governance that affect the division of powers. Such an ap-
proach would aid state courts in borrowing decisions and rationales 
from other jurisdictions. Also, I conclude, to the extent the Antifeder-
alist legacy is misguided in the state separation of powers context, in-
stitutional reform of state legislatures and executive offices may make 
its abandonment more plausible. 
II. SEPARATION OF POWERS AS A CONSTRAINT ON AGENCY 
RULEMAKING IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 
[P]erhaps there was no argument urged with more success, or more plausibly 
grounded against the Constitution ... than that founded on the mingling of 
the Executive and Legislative branches of Government in one body.17 
James Madison's comment during the First Congress evi-
dences the importance of competing visions of separation of powers 
during the founding era. The notion of separation of powers, rooted in 
the philosophies of Locke18 and Montesquieu, 19 has foundations that 
have been traced to the ancient Greek and Roman theories of mixed 
17. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 374. 
18. Although Locke regarded the legislative power as supreme, he did not believe it should 
be arbitrary. See JOHN LoCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 135-37, (C.B. Macpherson 
ed., 1980) (1690). In Locke's view, expressed in the opening sentence of the Declaration of 
Independence, the legislative power was subject to dissolution by the people. See id. §§ 220-22. 
It was also subject to the prerogative of the executive. See id. at ch. XN; see also Suri Ratna-
pla, John Locke's Doctrine of Separation of the Powers: A Re-Eualuation, 38 AM. J. JURIS. 189, 
196-220 (1993). 
19. Montesquieu justified separation of powers on the grounds that it protected against 
the encroachment of liberty by government. He wrote that "[w]hen legislative power is united 
with executive power in a single person or in a single body of the magistracy, there is no liberty, 
because one can fear that the same monarch or senate that makes tyrannical laws will execute 
them tyrannically." MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 157 (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds. & 
trans., 1989). 
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government. 20 Prior to adoption of the Constitution, the American 
colonies and Articles of Confederation endorsed notions of separation 
of powers but in ways designed to protect and expand legislature 
power. The Articles define the legislature as the primary lawmaking 
body that actively participates in every aspect of governance.21 Simi-
larly, in the colonies at the time, state constitutions endorsed separa-
tion of powers principles to sustain Whig legislative authority as 
"heirs to most of the prerogative powers taken away from the gover-
nors by the Revolution."22 Early state constitutions, for example, 
allowed legislatures to appoint governors, executive officers, and 
judges. 23 Separation of powers operated primarily as a restraint on 
the executive branches of government, designed to protect the legisla-
ture and, to a lesser extent, courts. 24 
When the Continental Congress was first created in 177 4, it 
followed the Whig approach by attempting to carry out administrative 
tasks by delegating executive powers to committees of its own mem-
bers. 25 In early years, "Congress was primarily itself the executive, 
the administrator."26 But Congress eventually found it necessary to 
pass some aspects of governance off to the executive. 27 The debate 
over the adoption of the Constitution revealed a more flexible, or 
mixed, understanding of separation of powers than Whig constitu-
tionalism endorsed. Publius' constitutional design incorporated the 
notion of separation of powers. Madison wrote: 'The accumulation of 
20. See M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 35-36 (1967). 
21. See DANIELJ. ELAZAR, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 133 (1988). Elazar, 
a political scientist known for his writing on federalism, writes, "the Whig tradition placed great 
emphasis on direct, active, continuous, and well-nigh complete popular control over the legisla-
ture and government in general, through such devices as small electoral districts, short tenures 
of office, many elective offices, sharp separations of power, and procedures approaching con-
stituent instruction of elected representatives." Id. at 109. See also DONALDS. Lurz, POPULAR 
CONSENT AND POPULAR CONTROL: WHIG POLITICAL THEORY IN THE EARLY STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
122 (1980) ("Whig political theory was, in fact, based upon legislative supremacy ... .'); Edward 
S. Corwin, The Progress of Constitutional Theory Between the Declaration of Independence and 
the Meeting of the Philadelphia Convention, 30 AM. HIST. REV. 511, 523-25 (1925) (discussing 
influence of Blackstone and Coke, who endorsed notions of legislative omnipotence, on Whig 
political theory). 
22. WOOD, supra note 13, at 162-63. 
23. See id. at 155-56. 
24. "When Americans in 1776 spoke of keeping the several parts of the government 
separate and distinct, they were primarily thinking of insulating the judiciary and particularly 
the legislature from executive manipulation.'' Id. at 157. See also Lurz, supra note 21, at 122 
("[S]eparation of powers amounted to little more than a prohibition on multiple officeholding, at 
least as far as the Whigs were concerned.'). 
25. See JENNINGS B. SANDERS, EvOLUTION OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS OF THE 
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 4-5 (1935). 
26. CHARLES C. THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1775-1789: A STUDY IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 57 (photo. reprint 1969) (1923). 
27. See LoUIS FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER 4-5 (4th ed. 1998). 
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all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands, 
whether of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self ap-
pointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of 
tyranny."2s 
However, in contrast to Whig notions of separation of powers, 
now championed by the Antifederalists,29 Madison argued for a flexi-
ble conception, one that allowed a single branch to exercise some of 
the powers of other branches: 
The several departments of power are [not separated but] blended in such a 
manner as at once to destroy all symmetry and beauty of form, and to expose 
some of the essential parts of the edifice to the danger of being crushed by the 
disproportionate weight of the other parts. 30 
In contrast to the Antifederalist ideals of strict separation and 
legislative supremacy, 31 the Federalists endorsed principles of mixed 
government, efficiency, and flexibility. 32 Unlike the Antifederalists, 
the Federalists saw sovereignty as residing in "the People"-not the 
legislature-and implicitly accepted that representatives of the People 
could reside in all three branches of government. 33 The legislature, on 
such an understanding, no longer held the supreme authority that 
28. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison). 
29. See WOOD, supra note 13, at 549-553 (describing Antifederalist separation of powers 
objections to the Constitution). The Antifederalists argued that Federalist separation of powers 
principles were poorly designed and were ineffective checks on government power. See Letter by 
An Officer of the Late Continental Army, PHILADELPHIA lNDEP. GAZETTEER, Nov. 6, 1787, 
reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 91, 93 (Herbert J. Storing ed. 1981) (seven-
volume set). The Antifederalists argued that separation of powers would be thwarted by the 
intertwined branches of government in the Constitution. For example, Cato wrote that the 
relations between the Senate and the President "will prevent either from being a check upon the 
other." Letters of Cato, N.Y.J., reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 123. For exam· 
ple, the Constitution authorizes the President to convene both houses of Congress and to veto 
legislation, which gives the executive power over the legislature, while it also grants the Senate 
some authority to act in an executive capacity. See, e.g., Letters from The Federal Farmer, in 2 
THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 214; Essay by Montezuma, PHILADELPHIA lNDEP. GAZETTEER, 
Oct. 17, 1787, reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 53-54. 
30. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison). In FEDERALIST Nos. 37 and 48, Madison 
further elaborated on the notion of sharing of power between the branches. 
31. See JOHN A. ROHR, To RUN A CONSTITUTION: THE LEGITIMACY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
STATE 78 (1986) (noting that Antifederalists had "considerable difficulty grasping the theoretical 
foundation of the new Constitution" because it did not fit their principle of legislative suprem-
acy); sources cited supra note 29 (quoting Cato, Federal Farmer, etc.). 
32. The system was aptly captured in the words of Justice Robert H. Jackson: "While the 
Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will 
integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches 
separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952). 
33. See Pushaw, supra note 10, at 411-25. 
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Whig constitutionalism-and later Antifederalists-endorsed. 34 The 
Federalist understanding of separation of powers35 is of contemporary 
relevance as a framework for organizing separation of powers princi-
ples applied by U.S. courts, including the nondelegation doctrine, and 
as a limitation on the unilateral exercise oflegislative power. 
A. The Nondelegation Doctrine 
According to Article I of the U.S. Constitution "all legislative 
powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United 
States." Beyond this curt provision, the text of the U.S. Constitution 
does not expressly address the delineation of power between the leg-
islative and executive branches. Yet federal courts have not shied 
away from developing a doctrine to assist in the interpretation of this 
constitutional provision. 
Three decisions from the 1930s provide the Supreme Court's 
strongest statement of the nondelegation doctrine. In Panama Refin-
ing Co. v. Ryan, 36 the Court held unconstitutional the section of the 
National Industrial Recovery Act that authorized the President "to 
prohibit the transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of 
petroleum . . . in excess of the amount permitted to be produced or 
withdrawn from storage by any state law or valid regulation .... "37 
According to Chief Justice Hughes, "Congress has declared no policy, 
has established no standard, has laid down no rule .... If§ 9(c) were 
held valid, it would be idle to pretend that anything would be left of 
limitations upon the power of the Congress to delegate its law-making 
function."38 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States39 invali-
34. Indeed, Madison and others explicitly warned of the legislative excess of Whig consti· 
tutionalism. Madison was reminded of "a tendency in our governments to throw all power into 
the Legislative vortex. The Executives of the States are in general little more than Cyphers; the 
legislatures omnipotent." 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 35 (Max 
Farrand, ed., 1911) (4 vols.). James Wilson predicted that, without checks, the "natural opera· 
tion of the Legislature will be to swallow up the Executive .... " 1 id. at 107. Others, such as 
Governeur Morris and John Mercer, also made efforts to highlight legislative aggrandizement 
and usurpation. See 2 id. at 52; 2 id. at 298. 
35. That Federalists disavowed legislative supremacy and believed in basic notions of 
blended or shared powers should not suggest agreement among all Federalists on separation of 
powers issues. Madison and Hamilton, for example, disagreed on whether executive powers 
were inherent or must be given by Congress. See JOHN P. ROCHE & LEONARD W. LEVY, THE 
PRESIDENCY 10·12 (1964); James Willard Hurst, Alexander Hamilton, Law Maker, 78 COLUM. L. 
REV. 483, 500·05 (1978); see also LEONARD D. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS: A STUDY IN 
ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 1789· 1801 (1948). 
36. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
37. Id. at 406 (quoting National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 709(c). 
38. Id. at 430. 
39. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
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dated another provision of the same statute-this a more sweeping 
delegation to the President to adopt "codes of fair competition"40-on 
similar grounds. A third case, Carter v. Carter Coal Co., invalidated a 
federal statute providing that maximum hours and minimum wages 
agreed upon by a majority of miners and mine-operators would be 
binding on the industry. 41 Stressing the peculiar dangers of delega-
tion to private actors, the Court observed that such a delegation ''is 
not even delegation to an official or an official body, presumptively 
disinterested, but to private persons whose interests may be and often 
are adverse to the interests of others in the same business."42 The 
classic doctrine, as expressed in Panama Refining, Schechter, and 
Carter Coal, invalidated legislation based on a lack of a substantive, 
"intelligible principle" articulated by Congress to evaluate an agency's 
compliance with a statute. 4a 
The doctrine was only invoked briefly during the 1930s. Since 
1935, the Supreme Court has not invalidated a single statute on non-
delegation grounds. By 1958, when Kenneth Culp Davis published 
the first version of his Administrative Law Treatise, he concluded: 
"Congress may and does lawfully delegate legislative power to ad-
ministrative agencies. Lawyers who try to win cases by arguing that 
congressional delegations are unconstitutional almost invariably do 
more harm than good to their clients' interests."44 Largely as a cri-
tique of the approach of states to nondelegation, Davis urged against 
federal courts scrutinizing the breadth of delegated discretion in 
statutory standards; instead, he suggested that courts look for proce-
dural safeguards-agency rulemaking procedures and the like-as a 
means of limiting agency discretion. 45 In result, if not in application, 
the post-New Deal federal courts can be said to have eventually fol-
lowed Davis' approach. 46 
40. Justice Cardozo, who had dissented in Panama Refining, concurred in Schechter, 
noting that this delegation created a "roving commission" that went far beyond the earlier case 
before the court. Id. at 551-52 (Cardozo, J., concurring). 
41. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
42. Id. at 311. 
43. See, e.g., J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) ("[I]f 
Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body 
authorized to [regulate] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delega-
tion of legislative power''). 
44. 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §2.01, at 75 (1st ed. 1958). 
45. See id. §2.15, at 151; see also KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 220-30 
(1969); Davis, supra note 11, at 725-30. 
46. See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 
737, 758-60 (D.D.C. 1971) (observing that the safeguard of judicial review and administrative 
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Adherence to a weak nondelegation doctrine is compatible with 
Federalist separation of powers principles. As Jerry Mashaw has 
suggested, delegation to agencies has functional advantages. First, 
delegation to agencies can assist in reducing the costs of making deci-
sions, including the monitoring and supervision costs; agencies have 
institutional advantages over legislatures that make them more cost 
effective.47 Second, Mashaw observes, delegation can make decision-
making more democratic to the extent it enhances the responsiveness 
of political decisions to the desires of the general electorate through 
accountability to the President, who is more responsible than the leg-
islature to diversity in voter preferences and better able to avoid vot-
ing cycles. 48 The prodelegation argument, endorsed by Mashaw and 
others,49 is compatible with Federalist separation of powers principles 
to the extent it depends on a flexible or mixed notion of each branch's 
power and urges, as did Madison, that democracy not be equated with 
simple majoritarianism. 50 
Yet the prodelegation position has not gone without criticism, 
both academic and judicial. Theodore Lowi, writing in the 1960s, 
characterized the placement of governmental authority in the hands 
of bureaucrats as a governmental failure. Congress's failure to give a 
clear and specific policy direction, according to Lowi, results in "an 
imposition of impotence."51 Since administrators are unable to pro-
duce the general statements of policy to establish new directions for 
regulatory programs, they are only able to use their delegated powers 
to respond in a piecemeal, ad hoc way to interest groups, violating no-
tions of representative governance. In the early 1980s, Peter Aranson, 
Ernest Gellhorn, and Glen Robinson grounded these arguments in the 
public choice literature, suggesting the delegation of congressional 
authority to agencies is structurally incompatible with the proper 
procedures is a primary function of the nondelegation doctrine); see also Richard B. Stewart, 
Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 323, 323 (1987). 
47. See JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO 
IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 148-52 (1997) [hereinafter MAsHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE); 
see also generally Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political 
Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985) [hereinafter Mashaw, Prodelegation]. 
48. See MAsHAW, GREED, CHAOS & GOVERNANCE, supra note 47, at 152-56. 
49. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Democracy Schmemocracy, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 795 (1999); 
Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 775 (1999); Harold J. Krent, Delegation and Its Discontents, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 710, 722-23 
(1994) (book review). 
50. For additional historical support for executive-led administration in Federalist doc-
trine and elsewhere, see generally ROHR, supra note 31, at 76-89; John A. Rohr, Public Admini-
stration, Executive Power, and Constitutional Confusion, 49 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 108 (1989). 
51. See THEODORE J. LoWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE CRISIS 
OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY 156 (1969). 
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functioning of separation of powers. 52 David Schoenbrod, writing in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, echoed these concerns, calling for the 
Supreme Court to rein in congressional delegations of power to agen-
cies by reviving the nondelegation doctrine. 53 
In the 1980s Justice Rehnquist attempted to revive the classic 
doctrine beginning with his concurrence in Industrial Union Depart-
ment v. American Petroleum Institute. 54 There he stated the case for 
strong enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine: 
First, and most abstractly, it ensures to the extent consistent with orderly gov-
ernmental administration that important choices of social policy are made by 
Congress, the branch of our Government most responsive to the popular will. 
Second, the doctrine guarantees that, to the extent Congress finds it necessary 
to delegate authority, it provides the recipient of that authority with an "intel-
ligible principle" to guide the exercise of the delegated legislative discretion. 
Third, and derivative of the second, the doctrine ensures that courts charged 
with reviewing the exercise of delegated discretion will be able to test that ex-
ercise against ascertainable standards.55 
In his dissent to American Textiles Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. 
Donovan, Justice Rehnquist more explicitly called for a revival of the 
nondelegation doctrine. 56 
Although, following Justice Rehnquist's suggestion, some lower 
courts referred to the doctrine as ''no longer ... moribund,''57 one must 
search far and wide to find lower court opinions striking delegations 
as unconstitutional. There are recent examples. A 1995 Eighth Cir-
cuit case, South Dakota v. United States Department of Interior, 58 
found statutory language authorizing the Secretary of Interior to ac-
quire any interest in land "for the purpose of providing land for Indi-
ans"59 an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. A 1999 
D. C. Circuit panel invoked the nondelegation doctrine as a reason for 
52. See generally Peter H. Aranson, et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1 (1982). 
53. See generally DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS 
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993); David Schoenbrod, Delegation and Democ-
racy: A Reply to my Critics, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 731 (1999). 
54. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685-86 (1980) 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
55. Id. at 685·86 (citations omitted). 
56. American Textiles Mfg. Inst. Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 547 (1981) (Rehnquist, 
C.J., dissenting). 
57. See, e.g., Fort Worth & Pac. Ry. v. Lewis, 693 F.2d 432, 435 n.8 (5th Cir. 1982). 
58. South Dakota v. United States Dep't of Interior, 69 F.3d 878, 884·85 (8th Cir. 1995), 
vacated, 519 U.S. 919 (1996). 
59. 25 u.s.c. § 465 (1999). 
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reversing the Environmental Protection Agency's interpretation of the 
scope of its authority to set ambient air quality standards under the 
Clean Air Act.60 While the D.C. Circuit panel drew on the rhetoric of 
nondelegation, it did not strike down the statutory provision but only 
the EPA's reading of it;61 thus, this case was decided more on statu-
tory interpretation than nondelegation grounds. But federal cases 
invoking nondelegation are very rare and do not appear to be sup-
ported by the Court's recent cases.62 Thus, despite the criticisms of 
scholars and Justice Rehnquist-as well as the handful of heretical 
opinions by lower courts, such as the Eighth Circuit-today it is well 
recognized that, in the federal system, limits on delegation are either 
nonexistent or underenforced. 
B. INS v. Chadha: Judicial Invalidation of the Legislative Veto 
It should come as no surprise that the United States Congress 
often seeks ways to oversee agency discretion that maximize the 
legislature's degree of control. Congress has a variety of tools at its 
disposal to do this; among them are the drafting of statutes, the 
power of appropriation, legislative review of executive appointments 
and removals, committee oversight of agency decisionmaking, and the 
legislative veto. 63 Although separation of powers jurisprudence has 
something to say about each of these, this Article focuses on its appli-
cation to the legislative veto. 
The legislative veto is often referred to as a type of ''rules re-
view"-a way, outside of seeking review in a court or enacting legisla-
tion, for a legislature to check agency rulemaking for rationality, cost-
effectiveness, consistency, and fair process. 64 The veto grew from the 
political science of Woodrow Wilson, who looked with skepticism on 
the ability of the American tripartite constitutional structure to effec-
tively accommodate the growth of bureaucracy in the executive 
branch and sought to introduce pro-parliamentary reforms to the U.S. 
60. See American Trucking Ass'n Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1037-38 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
61. See id. at 1038. 
62. Kenneth Culp Davis and Richard J. Pierce characterize the Court as abandoning its 
interest in reviving the nondelegation doctrine, evidenced by recent cases upholding delegations 
including Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (delegation to an independent agency), 
Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212 (1989) (delegation to executive agency), and 
Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160 (1991) (delegation to Attorney General). See 1 KENNETH 
CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 76, § 2.6, at 83-85 (3d ed. 
1994). 
63. See FISHER, supra note 27, at 68. 
64. Rules review, often institutionalized in state legislatures, is discussed further infra 
PartIII.C. 
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constitutional structure. 65 The legislative veto-"one of the most 
highly touted" Wilsonian reforms to the U.S. constitutional structure--
was enacted into law in the Reorganization Act of 1932 but did not 
begin to attract widespread attention until the 1960s and 1970s. 66 
As a policy tool, the legislative veto allows a legislature to 
delegate decisionmaking authority to administrative agencies while 
also retaining some ability to reject agency proposals. Legislative 
vetoes do not generally require legislatures to give specific reasons for 
rejecting the agency actions, but allow rejection of an agency's pro-
posal by a straight up or down vote of one or both chambers or by a 
legislative committee. 67 
Nearly fifty years after establishment of the veto, in the early 
1980s, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the one-house legislative veto 
and effectively held that concurrent resolution veto is also unconstitu-
tional. In INS v. Chadha, the Court declared that the legislative veto 
provision of section 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act is 
unconstitutional. 68 The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice 
Burger, concluded that the one-house legislative veto provisions of the 
statute failed to satisfy the bicameralism and presentment to the 
President requirements in Article I, Section 7 of the U.S. Constitu-
tion. The Court reasoned that the legislative veto was ''legislative" in 
its character and effect because it altered "the legal rights, duties, and 
relations of persons ... outside the Legislative Branch."69 The opinion 
was important, making front page headlines, because it effectively 
invalidated hundreds of legislative vetoes in federal statutes since the 
legislative veto had first been enacted into law in the Reorganization 
Act of 1932. 70 
As a constraint on rules review, separation of powers is seen by 
many participants in the political process as an effort to reduce access 
to the agency rulemaking process, and hence as undemocratic in its 
enforcement as a constitutional norm. Woodrow Wilson's political 
science, which viewed the legislative body as the supreme lawmaker 
in our democracy, lends historical support to these critics of the doc-
65. See generally WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS (Peter Smith ed. 1956) (1885). 
66. See JESSICA KORN, THE POWER OF SEPARATION: AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
THE MYTH OF THE LEGISLATIVE VETO 4-5 (1996). 
67. This avoids the normal legislative process in which the executive would have veto 
power over the legislature's attempts to statutorily prevent an agency action. 
68. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983). 
69. Id. at 952. 
70. See KORN, supra note 66, at 5-6. 
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trine. For Wilson and other critics of rigid application of separation of 
powers principles, the new problems posed by twentieth century 
democracy demand flexible solutions, and thus may require the re-
laxation of separation of powers principles to facilitate creative ap-
proaches to problems by the legislature. 71 This view found expression 
in Justice White's Chadha dissent,72 which critiqued the formalism of 
the majority opinion. According to Justice White, the legislative veto 
has become a central means by which Congress secures the accountability of 
executive and independent agencies. Without the legislative veto, Congress is 
faced with a Hobson's choice: either to refrain from delegating the necessary 
authority, leaving itself with a hopeless task of writing laws with the requisite 
specificity to cover endless special circumstances across the entire policy land-
scape, or in the alternative, to abdicate its law-making function to the execu-
tive branch and independent agencies. To choose the former leaves major na-
tional problems unresolved; to opt for the latter risks unaccountable 
policymaking by those not elected to fill that role.73 
Justice White would have upheld the legislative veto of legislative or 
quasi-legislative action as consistent with the purposes of Article I 
and separation of powers principles.74 Instead of endorsing the ma-
jority's view that separation of powers implements a ''hermetic sealing 
off of the three branches of Government from one another,"75 Justice 
White urged a balance of powers to effectuate the accommodation and 
practicality necessary for effective governance. 76 
Although Chadha's status as law has not been called into 
serious question since it was decided, there has been no dearth of 
criticism of the opinion and its formalism. 77 To achieve some of the 
objectives of the legislative veto without violating Chadha's rule, 
Congress recently adopted a formal mechanism for review of major 
agency rules-known as "joint resolution disapproval."78 Also, from 
71. See generally WILSON, supra note 65. 
72. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 967 (White, J., dissenting). 
73. Id. at 967-68. 
7 4. His dissent recognizes limits on the legislative veto to the extent it is used as a check 
on inherently executive functions, such as initiating prosecutions. See id. at 1002. 
75. Id. at 999 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 464 U.S. 1, 121 (1976)). 
76. See id. 
77. See generally KORN, supra note 66; E. Donald Elliott, INS v. Chadha: The Administra-
tive Constitution, the Constitution, and the Legislative Veto, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 125; Peter M. 
Shane, The Separation of Powers and the Rule of Law: The Virtues of "Seeing the Trees," 30 WM. 
& MARYL. REV. 375 (1989); Peter L. Strauss, Was There a Baby in the Bathwater? A Comment 
on the Supreme Court's Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 789; Laurence Tribe, The 
Legislative Veto Decision: A Law By Any Other Name?, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1984) , 
78. See Daniel Cohen & Peter L. Strauss, Congressional Review of Agency Regulations, 49 
ADMIN. L. REV. 95, 97 (1997); Michael Herz, The Legislative Veto in Times of Political Reversal: 
Chadha and the 104th Congress, 14 CONST. COMMENTARY 319, 319 (1997). 
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time to time general reform proposals surface that would clearly 
violate Chadha's rule, 79 but none of these have been adopted into law. 
Less obvious than those general reforms that clearly would 
violate Chadha's rule, Congress has continued to place legislative 
vetoes in subject-matter specific bills signed into law by the President. 
From the day that Chadha was issued through the end of 1997, Con-
gress has enacted more than four hundred legislative vetoes.80 In 
addition, Congress appears to have driven the legislative veto under-
ground, relying on informal understandings with the executive branch 
to perpetuate express congressional acquiescence in agency policy 
decisions. An example is the dispute that erupted in 1987 between 
Jam es Miller, III, the Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget, and the House Appropriations Committee. 81 When Miller 
objected on Chadha grounds to a provision that required the Admini-
stration to obtain "written prior approvaf' from the Appropriations 
Committee before transferring foreign assistance funds from one 
account to another, the Committee advised him that Congress would 
repeal the legislative veto but also take away the Administration's 
authority to transfer foreign assistance funds. 82 A couple of years 
later, the two branches finally reached a compromise when Congress 
removed the legislative veto from the public law but required the 
Administration to follow "the regular notification procedures of the 
committees on Appropriations" before transferring funds. 83 While 
these procedures did not appear in the public law, they required the 
Administration to notify committees of each transfer and provided a 
15-day waiting period during which the committees could object. 84 
Although committee objection had no legal effect, if the Administra-
tion ignored objections it proceeded at its peril and would likely lose 
its transfer authority.85 Because Congress wields the heavy stick of 
budget and lawmaking powers over executive branch agencies, infor-
79. See Stephen Gold, Welcome to the rule of rules, WASHINGTON TIMES, May 27, 1997, at 
A19 (describing present legislative proposal to require agencies to send proposed rules to 
Congress for an up or down vote). 
80. See FISHER, supra note 27, at 102. 
81. See FISHER, supra note 27, at 99-104; see also Lours FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, 
POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 129 (1992). 
82. See FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 81, at 129-30. 
83. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-167, §514, 103 Stat. 1195, 1219 (1990). 
84. See FISHER, supra note 27, at 99-104; see also FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 81, at 129-
30. 
85. See supra note 84. 
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mal committee vetoes continue to survive m many subject-matter 
specific contexts at the federal level. 86 
C. Connecting the Two Strands: The Convergence of 
Rationales for Separation of Powers 
Whig and Antifederalist approaches to separation of powers, 
reacting to the concentration of power in the hands of the monarchy 
and colonial governors, invoked separation of powers principles to 
protect against the concentration of executive power. By contrast, the 
Federalists invoked separation of powers doctrines to protect against 
the untutored masses, particularly as these masses found expression 
in unbridled legislative power. The Federalists thus invoked a more 
mixed conception of separation of powers, one that worked to limit 
legislative supremacy. In addition, while the protection of liberty 
against encroachment by government is one of the predominant ra-
tionales for separation of powers,87 the efficiency rationale of the 
Federalists should not be forgotten. Separation of powers, according 
to the views of many Federalists, fosters governmental efficiency by 
assigning numerous tasks to designated authorities without risking 
interference by other branches. 88 
In addition, it has been observed that the Federalist account of 
separation of powers fosters representation and accountability in 
government. It enhances representation to the extent that the domi-
nation of one branch of government by a single party, or faction, be-
comes of less significance in the overall lawmaking process. It en-
hances accountability to the extent that it encourages the various 
branches of government to take responsibility for decisions, rather 
than attempting to pass the buck to another branch with so many 
strings attached that the branch is unable to act independently but 
must risk taking the blame for bad decisions. 
Accountability, representation, and efficiency lay at the core of 
Federalist separation of powers principles, and to this effect the con-
stitutional norm retains its relevance even as government has ex-
86. As Michael Fitts warns, informal micropolitical factors would advise against overexag-
gerating the role of formal strncture. See Michael A. Fitts, The Foibles of Formalism: Applying 
a Political 'Transaction Cost" Analysis to Separation of Powers, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1643, 
1645-56 (1997). 
87. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing Montesquieu); Rebecca L. 
Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1513-14 (1991). 
88. See Louis Fisher, The Efficiency Side of Separated Powers, 5 J. AM. STUD. 113, 129-31 
(1971); William C. Banks, Efficiency in Government: Separation of Powers Reconsidered, 35 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 715, 718-23 (1984). 
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panded far beyond the expectations of our founders. Federal courts 
interpret the two strands of separation of powers affecting agency 
rulemaking to endorse an essentially prodelegation position-encour-
aging legislatures to delegate to agencies when they expect the dele-
gation to be welfare enhancing, while discouraging them from dele-
gating where they cannot trust agencies to regulate responsibly 
without strings, such as the legislative veto, attached.89 This ap-
proach to interpreting separation of powers principles is compatible 
with the spirit of the Federalist doctrine, but is incompatible with the 
Antifederalist ideal of legislative supremacy. 
At its simplest doctrinal level, the federal approach suggests 
weak enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine and strong enforce-
ment of limitations on legislative oversight. Delegation, it has been 
observed, has positive welfare implications and may be necessary to 
promote efficiency and flexibility in governance, consistent with the 
Federalist spirit. To the extent there are limits on delegation, it will 
be very difficult for courts to articulate certain standards for meas-
uring which delegations pass constitutional muster. By failing to 
enforce the nondelegation doctrine, federal courts allow for benefits of 
delegation without placing the courts in the awkward position of 
developing standards for enforcement. While compatible with Feder-
alist ideals of shared power and efficiency, a weak nondelegation 
doctrine thwarts the Antifederalist ideals of strict· separation and 
legislative supremacy. 
At the same time, federal courts since Chadha have inter-
preted separation of powers principles to imply some limits on legisla-
tive oversight. Harold Bruff and Ernest Gellhorn, writing before 
Chadha, observed that the presence of a legislative veto may encour-
age irresponsible delegation by Congress. Since with the legislative 
veto Congress holds the hope of checking agency policy at the imple-
mentation stage, this power encourages Congress to make more 
sweeping delegations than it otherwise would. 90 Effectively, Chadha 
may act as an indirect nondelegation doctrine by creating incentives 
against delegation by the legislature. After Chadha, Congress must 
be willing to part with the power to veto administrative action before 
89. On the merits of the prodelegation position, see MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND 
GOVERNANCE, supra note 47, at 131-57. 
90. See Harold H. Bruff & Ernest Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative 
Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1369, 1427 (1977). 
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it delegates authority to an administrative agency. 91 Without the 
strong degree of control provided by a legislative veto, as legislators 
face a decision whether to delegate authority to an administrative 
agency they will consider the importance of and ability to engage in 
other types of oversight of agency decisionmaking. With respect to 
some issues, legislators may decide continued legislative control of 
agency rulemaking is not important. However, with respect to many 
issues, legislative control may remain an important mechanism to 
legislators in making their decision to delegate. To the extent 
Chadha places limits on the ability of the Congress to engage in con-
trol with the legislative veto, it acts as a disincentive against delega-
tion without requiring courts to step in and articulate standards for 
measuring nondelegation. To this extent, the two strands of separa-
tion of powers, though seemingly prodelegation, may be in tension. 
Nevertheless, any tension that exists between the two strands in the 
federal system is probably of minor concern in practice. The fact that 
since Chadha the United States Congress has continued to engage in 
sweeping delegations of authority to agencies suggests that the disin-
centive against delegation is probably not strong enough to achieve 
the same result as reinvigorating the nondelegation doctrine, as 
Schoenbrod and many other critics recommend. 
Chadha's formalism eschews the notions of mixed government 
endorsed in Federalist separation of powers principles. But Chadha's 
result-invalidation of the legislative veto and a reduction of unilateral 
control over executive decisions-may promote Federalist goals to the 
extent it encourages more responsible and accountable delegation and 
works to limit legislative supremacy over bureaucracy. Thus, Chadha 
is consistent with the Antifederalist strict separation ideal, but is 
inconsistent with the Antifederalist notion of legislative supremacy. 
ill. SEPARATION OF POWERS AS A CONSTRAINT ON STATE 
AGENCY RULEMAKING 
Separation of powers doctrines at the state level affect the 
quality of governance that state agencies are able to deliver to their 
91. See Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of 
Administrative Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 62, 75-77 (1990); 
Harold J. Krent, Separating the Strands in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74 VA. L. REV. 
1253, 1282-83 (1988); Strauss, supra note 77, at 809-12. Cf. SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, THE 
CONSTITUTION AND THE DELEGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER 109 (1975) {observing that 
techniques of "legislative oversight in some manner provide substitutes for congressional 
adherence to the principles of nondelegation"). 
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citizens. To the extent agencies at the state level are unable to de-
liver important programs, the demand for federal regulation may 
increase. Thus state separation of powers doctrine, by influencing the 
size of the federal government, may unintentionally affect the balance 
of powers between the federal and state governments. 
Despite the Federalist views of separation of powers, the U.S. 
Constitution fails to dictate a specific form of separation of powers for 
state governments. According to the Guarantee Clause of the Consti-
tution, "[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this 
Union a Republican Form of Government .... "92 Although one might 
argue that this requires some minimal level of separation of powers in 
the states, 93 the clause has been held enforceable only by Congress 
rather than by the federal courts;94 at best, the U.S. Constitution 
speaks in a "whisper" to separation of powers in the states. 95 Thus, to 
the extent separation of power principles apply at all to the states, 
they emanate primarily from state constitutional law, not from the 
U.S. Constitution. 
Separation of powers principles were contained in state consti-
tutions at the time of the Articles of Confederation and continue to 
play an important role as state courts attempt to define the relation-
ship between the legislature and the administrative state. Unlike the 
U.S. Constitution, which does not explicitly address separation of 
powers, most state constitutions contain explicit separation of powers 
clauses. The texts of these clauses, however, do not predict the out-
comes of state judicial opinions. 
92. U.S. CONST. art. IV,§ 4. 
93. See, e.g., Fox v. McDonald, 13 So. 416, 420 (Ala. 1893) (noting that the guarantee of a 
republican form of government vests the power of selecting governmental officers in the people, 
and that the power to appoint to office is not an inherently executive function); see also Michael 
C. Dort The Relevance of Federal Norms for State Separation of Powers, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. 
L. REV. 51, 52 (1998) (arguing that some measure of separation of powers in state government is 
a structural requirement of the U.S. Constitution and that the Guaranty Clause is the best 
textual source for this requirement); Marc E. Elkins, Comment, Treatment of the Separation of 
Powers Doctrine in Kansas, 29 U. KAN. L. REV. 243, 246-48 (1981} (discussing framers' intent 
regarding Guarantee Clause and separation of powers doctrine at the state level). 
94. See Pacific States Tel.·& Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 133, 137 (1912) (Congress's 
determination of whether a particular state government's form is "republican'' in form is binding 
on every other department of government); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849) 
(determination of whether a particular state government is "republican" is for Congress, not the 
courts). But see Dorf, supra note 93, at 67 (arguing that Guaranty Clause claims may be 
justiciable in state court); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: 
Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1988) (arguing that Guarantee Clause 
could be used to set some minimum degree of autonomy for states against federal regulation). 
95. See Dorf, supra note 93, at 77 (noting that the U.S. Constitution forecloses "only those 
arrangements deeply offensive to principles of representative government'). 
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Administrative law scholars in the 1960s described a general 
trend in the states towards upholding broad delegations when proce-
dural safeguards, or other minimal protections, are in place to protect 
against the arbitrary exercise of executive power.96 However, despite 
the predictions of 1960s and 1970s scholars, in the states, unlike the 
federal system, the nondelegation doctrine is alive and well in the late 
1990s. Many states require the legislature to provide specific stan-
dards to guide agency discretion in the statute delegating authority to 
an agency. Although some states endorse Davis' safeguards ap-
proach, favoring broad delegation to administrative agencies, most 
states reject it. This departs from the approach of most federal courts 
in interpreting separation of powers principles affecting the nondele-
gation doctrine. 97 
As in the federal system, in most state systems separation of 
powers works to constrain legislative control over the executive. In 
many state administrative processes, rules review is an active part of 
the rulemaking process, much more integral to agency rulemaking 
process than at the federal level. 98 Separation of powers may limit 
the power of legislatures to delegate rulemaking authority to agencies 
with strings attached that allow legislative oversight without engag-
ing the full constitutional lawmaking process. In addition, "take care" 
clauses may limit a legislature's ability to interfere with agency rule-
making. Yet, as I shall argue, enforcement of this separation of pow-
ers principle by state courts is weaker than at the federal level. 
Although many describe state courts as adopting a deferential 
position towards, and rarely deviating from, federal constitutional 
doctrine,99 in the separation of powers context the approach of many 
state courts, echoing Antifederalist ideals, contrasts starkly with the 
approach of federal courts. The approach of state courts to interpret-
ing these doctrines appears to transcend constitutional text. 
96. See 1 FRANK E. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 81 (1965); see also KENNETH 
CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE§ 3.01, at 149 (2d ed. 1978). 
97. This is not inconsistent with what Davis described in the 1950s, when he observed 
''numerous delegations by state legislatures have been invalidated, and the non-delegation 
doctrine in the state courts continues to have a good deal of force during the nineteen-fifties." 1 
DAVIS, supra note 44, § 2.07, at 101. 
98. An overview is provided in NATIONALAsSOCIATION ON ADMINISTRATIVE RULES REVIEW, 
1996-97 ADMINISTRATIVE RULES REVIEW DIRECTORY AND SURVEY (1996) [hereinafter NAAR.R]. 
Examples are discussed infra, at Part ill.C. 
99. See Ronald K.L. Collins & Peter J. Galie, Models of Post-Incorporation Judicial 
Review: 1985 Survey of State Constitutional Individual Rights Decisions, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 317, 
332-39 (1986); Peter J. Galie, Modes of Constitutional Interpretation: The New York Court of 
Appeals' Search for a Role, 4 EMERGING ISSUES IN ST. CONST. L. 225, 226 (1991). See also BARRY 
LATZER, STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 158 (1991) (estimating that, in criminal 
law decisions, state courts deviate from federal doctrine in less than one-third of their cases). 
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A. Separation of Powers Provisions in State Constitutions 
Separation of powers is a bedrock principle to the constitutions 
of each of the fifty states. Since the time of the founding, most state 
constitutions have expressly acknowledged separation of powers 
principles in their constitutional texts.100 The language of state sepa-
ration of powers clauses has its origin in the Virginia, Maryland, 
North Carolina, Georgia, and Massachusetts constitutions in exis-
tence during debates over adoption of the U.S. Constitution.101 The 
Virginia Constitution of 1776, the first to make separation of powers a 
statement of positive law, contained a provision requiring "[t]hat the 
Legislative and Executive powers of the State should be separate and 
distinct from the Judicative."102 The Massachusetts Constitution of 
1780 endorsed a separation of powers provision stating: 
In the government of this Commonwealth, the legislative department shall 
never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them: The execu-
tive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them: 
The judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either 
of them: to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.103 
Modern state constitutions borrow from the tradition established by 
these early constitutions. Separation of powers principles are ex-
pressed in three basic approaches in the texts of state constitutions. 
The overwhelming majority of modern state constitutions 
contain a strict separation of powers clause. This clause is strict to 
the extent it not only divides power between the various branches but 
also instructs that one branch is not to exercise the powers of any of 
the others, much as the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780. For 
example, Florida's Constitution states: 
The powers of the state government shall be divided into legislative, executive 
and judicial branches. No person belonging to one branch shall exercise any 
[of the] powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly 
provided herein.104 
100. See WOOD, supra note 13, at 150-61. 
101. See Bernard Schwartz, Curiouser and Curiouser: The Supreme Court's Separation of 
Powers Wonderland, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 587, 588 (1990). 
102. Id. 
103. This provision was contained in Massachusetts' Declaration of Rights. See id. at 588· 
89. 
104. FLA. CONST. art. II, §3. 
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While this language seems strong, Florida is not unique. Thirty-five 
states have such clauses in their constitutions.105 
A general separation of powers clause, by contrast, simply 
divides the powers of government into three branches, without pro-
hibiting one branch from exercising the power of another. An exam-
ple is North Carolina's Constitution, which states: ''The legislative, 
executive and supreme judicial powers of the State government shall 
be forever separate and distinct . . . ."106 Five states have general 
separation of powers clauses. 107 
In each of the remaining ten states, there is no explicit separa-
tion of powers clause in the state constitution. In these states, sepa-
ration of powers is inferred from the allocation of powers to each of 
the branches of government, in a manner similar to its inference from 
the allocation of power among the branches in the U.S. Constitution. 
B. State Approaches to Nondelegation 
A constitutional text provides only a context for interpretation 
and application of separation of powers principles by state courts. 
Not surprisingly, among state courts, there is a diversity of ap-
proaches towards interpreting separation of power provisions for 
nondelegation purposes. 108 The approaches of the state courts vary, 
even where constitutional texts are sometimes similar or identical. 
1. ''Weak'' Nondelegation States 
A handful-and only a handful-of states follow the Davis "pro-
cedural safeguards" approach, upholding legislative delegations as 
long as the agency has adequate procedural safeguards in place. For 
example, in Barry and Barry, Inc. v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 
105. See ALA. CONST. art. ill §§ 42, 43; ARIZ. CONST. art. ill; ARK. CONST. art. 4 §§ 1, 2; 
CAL. CONST. art. 3, § 3; COLO. CONST. art. 3; FLA. CONST. art. 2, § 3; GA. CONST. art. I,§ 2, ,3; 
IDAHO CONST. art. II, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. 2, § 1; IND. CONST. art. 3, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. 3, § 1; 
KY. CONST. §§ 27, 28; LA. CONST. art. 2, §§ 1, 2; ME. CONST. art. 3, §§ 1, 2; MD. CONST. art. 8; 
MAss. CONST. pt. I, art. 30; MICH. CONST. art. 3, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. 3, § 1(amended1974); 
MISS. CONST. art. 1, §§ 1, 2; Mo. CONST. art. 2, § 1; MONT. CONST. art. III, § 1; NEB. CONST. art. 
II, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. 3, § 1; N.J. CONST. art. 3, , 1; N.M. CONST. art. 3, § 1; OKLA. CONST. 
art. 4, § 1; OR. CONST. art. ill, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 8; TENN. CONST. art. 2, §§ 1, 2; TEX. 
CONST. art. 2, § 1; UTAH CONST. art. 5, § 1; VT. CONST. chap. II, § 5; VA. CONST. art. ill, § 1; W. 
VA. CONST. art. 5, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. 2, § 1. 
106. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 6. 
107. See CONN. CONST. art. 2; N.H. Const. pt. I, art. 37; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 6; R.I. CONST. 
art. 5 (discussing amendments); S.D. CONST. art. II. 
108. An earlier survey is Gary J. Creco, Standards or Safeguards: A Survey of the Delega· 
tion Doctrine in the States, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 567 (1994). I am indebted to Creco's survey, 
but I have attempted to update and refine his summary of state doctrine. 
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the Washington Supreme Court held that a statute authorizing the 
Director of the Department of Motor Vehicles to establish the maxi-
mum fees that can be charged to employment agencies was a constitu-
tional delegation of legislative authority.109 The statute at issue used 
extremely broad language to authorize the Director to issue "reason-
able rules and regulations," but did not contain specific standards to 
assist the Director in setting maximum fees. 110 In upholding the 
statute, the court, citing Davis' treatise, reasoned that delegation 
promotes efficiency and flexibility, and avoids courts' need to rely on 
''vague adjectives of generality such as 'reasonable' or 'appropriate."'m 
While previous Washington law required some consideration of the 
degree of standards present in the statute, the court departed from 
this case law, suggesting that it be ''relegated to a minor position in 
the juristic firmament."112 At the same time, the court noted, "[t]he 
focus of judicial inquiries ... should shift from statutory standards to 
administrative safeguards and administrative standards."113 The 
court reasoned that such safeguards "can ensure that administra-
tively promulgated rules and standards are as subject to public scru-
tiny and judicial review .... "114 
For purposes of analysis, I will classify states such as Wash-
ington as the "weak" nondelegation states.115 In addition to Washing-
ton, these states116 include California (strict separation of powers 
clause "S"), 117 Iowa (8), 118 Maryland (S), 119 Oregon (S), 120 and Wiscon-
109. Barry & Barry, Inc., v. Washington Dep't. of Motor Vehicles, 500 P.2d 540, 546 (Wash. 
1972) (en bane). 
110. See id. at 541-42. 
111. Id. at 543. 
112. Id. at 545. 
113. Id. at 543-44 (quoting Davis). 
114. Id. at 545. 
115. I include among the weak nondelegation states Arkansas, whose Supreme Court has 
held that the determining factor in assessing the constitutionality of a delegation is whether the 
legislature bas retained control of the agency. See Arkansas Motor Carriers Ass'n v. Pritchett, 
798 S.W.2d 918, 920 (Ark. 1990). If legislative control is the test, then virtually any delegation 
survives so long as the legislature retains the ability to grant or withdraw powers. 
116. To clarify the relationship between constitutional text and nondelegation doctrine, 
state constitutions with a strict separation of powers clause are designated with a "S,'' general 
clause states with a "G,'' and those states with no separation of powers clause with an "N." 
117. See People v. Wright, 639 P.2d 267, 271 (Cal. 1982) (upholding reasonable grant of 
power to agency where suitable safeguards are in place to guide the agency's discretion). 
118. See Iron Workers Local No. 67 v. Hart, 191 N.W.2d 758, 772 (Iowa 1971) (noting that 
"the important consideration is not whether the statute delegating the power expresses precise 
standards but whether the procedure established for the exercise of power furnishes adequato 
safeguards for those affected by the administrative action''). 
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sin (no explicit separation of powers clause, ''N'').121 Notably, despite 
the relaxed approach of these state courts towards interpreting sepa-
ration of powers principles, all of these states' constitutions contain 
strict separation of powers clauses, save Washington's and Wiscon-
sin's, which contain no explicit separation of powers clause. 
While in the 1960s and 1970s Davis, as well as many later 
commentators, suggested that this approach was the "trend" in state 
constitutionalism, its status as a trend is more questionable today. 
Many state supreme courts invoke a strong or moderate version of the 
nondelegation doctrine, rather than the weak version endorsed by 
federal courts. This is true regardless of the texts of state constitu-
tions, although for some state courts constitutional text is given some 
weight in addressing the issue. No recent state supreme court deci-
sions explicitly adopt the procedural safeguards approach in lieu of 
traditional nondelegation doctrines, as Washington and many other 
states did in the 1960s and 1970s. 
2. "Strong" Nondelegation States 
The recent Texas Supreme Court case, Texas Boll Weevil 
Eradication Foundation, Inc. v. Lewellen ("Boll Weevil") provides an 
example of a strong nondelegation decision.122 A 1993 Texas statute 
authorized the Commissioner of Agriculture to certify a nonprofit 
organization, representing cotton growers, to create a private entity 
called the "Official Cotton Growers' Boll Weevil Eradication Founda-
tion" (''Foundation'').123 The Foundation was authorized to propose 
geographic eradication zones and to conduct referenda in each zone to 
establish whether those cotton growers wished to establish an official 
boll weevil eradication zone. If an official zone was established, the 
Foundation proposed assessments for cotton growers to pay subject to 
119. See Department of Transp. v. Armacost, 532 A.2d 1056, 1060 (Md. 1987) (observing 
that delegations by the legislature, especially in areas of public health and safety, are valid 
when the legislature provides sufficient safeguards to guide the agency). 
120. See Warren v. Marion County, 353 P.2d 257 (Or. 1960) (citing Davis and concluding 
that the important consideration is whether the procedure established in making the delegation 
provides adequate safeguards to those affected by agency actions, not whether the statute 
mandates specific standards). 
121. See Gilbert v. Medical Examining Bd., 349 N.W.2d 68, 77-78 (Wis. 1984) (finding that 
broad grants of authority, such as a grant to Medical Examining Board to "define and enforce 
professional conduct and unethical practices," will be upheld where adequate procedural safe-
guards are in place). 
122. Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. 1997). 
123. TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN.§§ 74.101-.127 (West 1995) (amended 1995 and 1997) (statutes 
governing foundations). 
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the growers' approval in a subsequent referendum.124 The Foundation 
was also given broad powers to impose penalties for late payment of 
assessments and to recommend to the Department of Agriculture that 
nonpaying growers' crops be destroyed.125 The statute contained few 
checks on the Foundation's powers, apart from referenda and a re-
quirement that the Commissioner of Agriculture certify the organiza-
tion petitioning to become the Foundation. 126 
The court invalidated the statute on the grounds that the 
Texas Legislature had unconstitutionally delegated power to the 
Foundation in violation of the separation of powers clause of the 
Texas Constitution.127 After summarizing dissenting and concurring 
U.S. Supreme Court opinions and scholarly criticism endorsing a 
revival of the nondelegation doctrine, 128 the court observed that 
"[s]tate courts may have less need to reinvigorate the doctrine, since 
they have historically been more comfortable with striking down state 
laws on this basis than their federal counterparts."129 
Illustrating the difference in approach between states like 
Texas and the federal courts, the court referred to three Texas cases 
addressing the nondelegation doctrine: in Texas Antiquities Commit-
tee v. Dallas County Community College District, 130 a plurality of the 
justices expressed the view that the Antiquities Committee's charge to 
prevent demolition of all ''buildings ... and locations of historical ... 
interest'' was so vague that it failed to provide reasonable standards 
to support the delegation;131 Bullock v. Calvert struck down legisla-
tion granting the Secretary of State the power to decide whether state 
funds could be used in primary elections because it gave the agency 
unbridled discretion;132 and Ex parte Leslie, 133 in which the Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals struck down a statute that gave the Live 
Stock Sanitary Commission the power to punish cattle farmers for 
failing to dip their cattle, because the statute did not contain reason-
able standards to guide the Commission. While Boll Weevil addresses 
124. See Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 457. 
125. See id. at 457-58. 
126. See id. 
127. TEX. CONST. art. 2, § 1 (providing for division of powers of Texas State Government). 
128. See Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 465-68. 
129. Id. at 468. 
130. Texas Antiquities Comm. v. Dallas County Community College Dist., 554 S.W.2d 924 
(Tex. 1977). 
131. Id. at 927. 
132. Bullock v. Calvert, 480 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. 1972). 
133. Ex parte Leslie, 223 S.W. 227 (Tex. Crim. App. 1920). 
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legislative delegation to a private board, not an administrative 
agency, the case illustrates how the Texas.Supreme Court adopts a 
much more rigorous test than federal courts for evaluating whether a 
legislative delegation of power is constitutional.134 
Florida also endorses a strong separation of powers doctrine. 
The key modern case, Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 135 held uncon-
stitutional an environmental statute delegating to an agency, the 
Administration Commission, the authority to designate geographic 
areas of critical state concern-subject to additional planning require-
ments-and, in certain instances, to adopt land use regulations. The 
statute enunciated several limitations on agency designation of areas, 
allowing the "critical state concern" designation only if: (1) the area 
contains or has a significant impact upon "environmental, historical, 
natural, or archeological resources of regional or statewide impor-
tance"; (2) the area is "significant[ly] affected by, or [has] a significant 
effect upon, an existing or proposed major public facility or other area 
of major public investment''; or (3) the area has major development 
potential, such as the proposed site of a new community. 136 
Despite these limits on agency discretion in the statute, the 
Florida Supreme Court struck the statute as unconstitutional on 
nondelegation grounds. While the court acknowledged a need for an 
agency to "flesh out'' policy, it also noted that this is "far different 
from that agency making the initial determination of what policy 
should be."137 Based on a somewhat formalistic interpretation of 
Florida's strict separation of powers clause, the court rejected Davis' 
procedural safeguards approach, holding that the Florida Legislature 
is required, at a minimum, to provide some standards or guidelines to 
aid the agency in exercising its discretion.138 The court also acknowl-
edged how the presence of such standards or guidelines aids judicial 
review. 139 Since Askew, the Florida Supreme Court has had several 
occasions to revisit the doctrine and has consistently reaffirmed the 
need for specific standards and guidelines in legislation to validate a 
delegation of legislative authority to an agency.140 
134. The contrast is obvious when the Boll Weevil case is compared to the Third Circuit's 
decision upholding a similar private delegation to increase beef sales in United States v. Frame, 
885 F.2d 1119, 1127-29 (3d Cir. 1989). 
135. Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So.2d 913 (Fla. 1979). 
136. Id. at 914 (describing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.05(2) (West 1975) (amended 1997 and 
1998) (defining areas which may be designated areas of critical concern)). 
137. Id. at 920. 
138. See id. at 924. 
139. See id. at 925. 
140. See, e.g., B.H. v. State, 645 So.2d 987, 993-94 (Fla. 1994) Guvenile escape statute 
invalid because it did not contain specific criteria or standards for agency to apply); Chiles v. 
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States following a "strong" nondelegation approach, in a fash-
ion similar to Texas (S) and Florida (S), include Arizona (S),141 Illinois 
(S),142 Kentucky (S),143 Massachusetts (S),144 Montana (S),145 Nebraska 
(S), 146 Nevada (S), 147 New Hampshire (general separation of constitu-
tional powers clause "G"),148 New Mexico (S),149 New York (N),150 Ohio 
Children, 589 So.2d 260, 266-67 (Fla. 1991) (statute authorizing an agency to take steps to 
reduce the state budget violates separation of powers doctrine because of "inadequate legislative 
direction'). But see Florida Gas Transmission Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 635 So.2d 941, 944 
(Fla. 1994) (pipeline certification statute contained sufficient standards and guidelines and thus 
did not violate nondelegation doctrine). 
141. See State v. Williams, 583 P.2d 251, 254 (Ariz. 1978) (en bane) (standards necessary 
for valid delegation, although they need not be set forth in express terms if standards "might 
reasonably be inferred from the statutory scheme as a whole') (citing State v. Arizona Mines 
Supply Co., 484 P.2d 619, 625 (Ariz. 1971)). 
142. See Stofer v. Motor Vehicle Cas. Co., 369 N.E.2d 875, 879 (Ill. 1977) (requiring statute 
to set forth persons and activities potentially subject to regulation, the harm to be prevented, 
and the general means available to the agency to prevent the identified harm); see also Thyge-
sen v. Callahan, 385 N.E.2d 699, 701-02 (Ill. 1979) (striking statute based on Stofer test). At the 
same time, older cases and recent cases in Illinois apply an "intelligible principle" test that is 
similar to many of the strong nondelegation states. See Hill v. Relyea, 216 N.E.2d 795, 797 (Ill. 
1966) ("intelligible" principle required, although "the precision of the permissible standard must 
necessarily vary according to the nature of the ultimate objective and the problems involved'); 
see also Warrior v. Thompson, 449 N.E.2d 53, 57 (Ill. 1983) (applying ''intelligible principle" 
test); People v. Carter, 454 N.E.2d 189, 190-91 (Ill. 1982) (applying Hill "intelligible principle" 
test). Because of the Hill test, Illinois probably belongs in the strong delegation category. See 
George Bunn et al., No Regulation Without Representation: Would Judicial Enforcement of a 
Stricter Nondelegation Doctrine Limit Administratiue Lawmaking?, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 341, 345-
51 (arguing Illinois has one of the strongest nondelegation doctrines of any state). 
143. See Legislative Research Comm'n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 915 (Ky. 1984) (holding 
that a valid delegation of powers must contain sufficient standards to control the exercise of 
discretion, and that implicit in this standards requirement is the need for procedural safe-
guards) (citing Holsclaw v. Stephens, 507 S.W.2d 462, 471(Ky.1974)). 
144. See Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 471N.E.2d1266, 1273-74 
(Mass. 1984) (upholding delegation to the Commissioner of Revenue to modify infrastructure 
development assessment rates, but noting that statute provided sufficient and "clear legislative 
standards" to guide the agency in making decisions). 
145. See Bacus v. Lake County, 354 P.2d 1056, 1061 (Mont. 1960) (holding that the legisla-
ture must delimit powers delegated to an agency with "reasonable clarity'' and provisions must 
be "sufficiently clear, definite, and certain to enable the agency to know its rights and obliga· 
tions'). 
146. See Kwik Shop, Inc. v. City of Lincohi, 498 N.W.2d 102, 108-09 (Neb. 1993) (striking 
down statute on grounds that legislature did not provide the local governing bodies "adequate, 
sufficient, and definite standards within which they are to exercise their discretion'). But see 
Bosselman, Inc. v. State, 432 N.W.2d 226, 230-31 (Neb. 1988) (holding statute constitutional 
where legislature gave "reasonable limitations and standards for carrying out the delegated 
duties') (quoting Ewing v. Board of Equalization, 420 N.W.2d 685, 690 (Neb. 1988)). 
147. See Sheriff, Clark County v. Luqman, 697 P.2d 107, 110-11 (Nev. 1985) (upholding 
controlled substances statute because statute provided sufficient standards to guide the agency 
for the purpose and power authorized). 
148. See Guillou v. Division of Motor Vehicles, 503 A.2d 838, 840-42 (N.H. 1986) (holding 
unconstitutional statute that authorized the Director of Motor Vehicles to suspend or revoke a 
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(N),151 Oklahoma (S),152 Pennsylvania (N),153 South Dakota (G),154 
South Carolina (S),155 Virginia (S),156 and West Virginia (S).157 One 
state, Utah, has held that the legislature is prohibited from delegat-
ing any of its functions to specific persons within the executive de-
partment.158 In these states, statutes are periodically struck on non-
delegation grounds. These state courts differ both in doctrine and in 
enforcement from their federal counterparts in assessing the nondele-
gation issue. 
driver's license "for any cause which he may deem sufficient" because the statute failed to 
identify a "general" policy or to articulate "specific standards" for agency action). 
149. See Montoya v. O'Toole, 610 P.2d 190, 191-92 (N.M. 1980) (requiring sufficient and 
clear legislative standards). 
150. See Boreali v. Axelrod, 517 N.E.2d 1350, 1353-56 (N.Y. 1987) (striking a statute 
authorizing the Public Health Commission to "deal with any matters affecting the ... public 
health'' because delegation did not contain reasonable safeguards and standards) (citing Levine 
v. Whalen, 349 N.E.2d 820, 822 (N.Y. 1976)). 
151. See Blue Cross v. Ratchford, 416 N.E.2d 614, 618 (Ohio 1980) (concluding that a rate 
statute is not an unconstitutional delegation if it establishes a "practical" standard or an 
"intelligible principle" for an administrator to conform to and it contains procedures for review 
of agency discretion; where deference to agency expertise is important, court noted that it may 
be appropriate for agency itself to establish standards). 
152. See Oliver v. Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 359 P.2d 183, 187 (Okla. 
1961) (holding that for delegation to be valid, the legislature must both declare the ''policy of the 
law" and a "rule of action or framework" to guide the agency's exercise of power); Democratic 
Party v. Estep, 652 P.2d 271, 277-78 (Okla. 1982) (holding legislature must "establish its policies 
and set out definite standards for the exercise of an agency's rulemaking power" for delegation 
of power to be valid). 
153. Although Pennsylvania has not articulated a single nondelegation doctrine, a concur-
ring opinion provides one of the clearer statements. See Commonwealth v. Sessoms, 532 A.2d 
775, 784 (Pa. 1987) (Papadakos, J., concurring) (arguing that legislation must contain adequate 
safeguards to guide and restrain the agency's exercise of delegated power, setting limits on 
agency powers and procedures). 
154. See In re Application No. 5189-3, 467 N.W.2d 907, 913 (S.D. 1991) (noting that valid 
delegation must set forth general policy and give the agency guidance). 
155. See Bauer v. South Carolina State Hous. Auth., 246 S.E.2d 869, 876 (S.C. 1978) 
(finding statute unconstitutional if it grants "[a]bsolute, unregulated, and undefined discretion 
in an administrative body," although court may reasonably imply standards from legislation if 
not in express terms of statute). 
156. See Chapel v. Commonwealth, 89 S.E.2d 337, 342-43 0fa. 1955) (striking down statute 
that gave Dry Cleaner's Board authority to ''promulgate such rules and regulations as it deemed 
necessary" to regulate the business because legislature failed to fix a standard to direct and 
guide the Board in rulemaking or to make findings that regulation required control by agency 
with broad discretionary powers). 
157. See State ex rel. Barker v. Manchin, 279 S.E.2d 622, 631 ('N. Va. 1981) (noting that 
legislature may not vest "uncontrolled discretion" in an agency, but must provide "sufficient 
standards or policy for guidance"). 
158. See State v. Gallion, 572 P.2d 683, 686-87 (Utah 1977). 
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3. "Moderate" Nondelegation Doctrine 
Many states do not clearly fit either the strong or weak ap-
proach to the nondelegation doctrine. In other words, these states do 
not always require specific standards, but may vary the degree of 
standards necessary depending on the subject matter of the statute or 
the scope of the statutory directive. At the same time, in these states 
procedural safeguards alone are rarely enough for a delegation to be 
valid. 
For example, the Colorado Supreme Court has observed that, 
while the legislature must provide sufficient standards in a statute 
delegating power to an administrative agency, "this court has repeat-
edly emphasized the impracticality and inappropriateness, in many 
contexts, of requiring anything more than the most broad and general 
standards. . . ."159 The court stated that the test "is not simply 
whether the delegation is guided by standards, but whether there are 
sufficient statutory standards and safeguards, and administrative 
standards and safeguards, in combination, to protect against unnec-
essary and uncontrolled exercise of discretionary power."160 If ade-
quate statutory standards and safeguards are not present, the court 
suggested that ''it must be determined whether additional adminis-
trative standards and safeguards accomplish the necessary protection 
from arbitrary action."161 
States adopting an approach similar to Colorado (S) include: 
Alabama (S), 162 Alaska (N), 163 Connecticut (G), 164 Delaware (N), 165 
159. Cottrell v. City of Denver, 636 P.2d 703, 708 (Colo. 1981) (en bane). 
160. Id. at 709. 
161. Id. at 710. See also People v. Holmes, 959 P.2d 406, 410-11 (Colo. 1998) (applying 
Cottrell to uphold constitutionality of a statute establishing criminal penalties for violation of 
contraband regulations adopted by administrative heads of detention facilities). 
162. See Bailey v. Shelby County, 507 So.2d 438, 443 (Ala. 1987) (upholding delegation but 
suggesting that both standards and safeguards are relevant to assessing constitutionality of 
delegation). 
163. See Usibelli Coal Mine, Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources, 921 P .2d 1134, 1145 
(Alaska 1996) (noting that there is less need for standards where legislature has delegated 
"broad authority to an agency with expertise to regulate a narrowly defined field,'' but also 
acknowledging that statute contained both standards and safeguards); Municipality of Anchor-
age v. Anchorage Police Dep't. Employees Ass'n, 839 P.2d 1080, 1084-85 (Alaska 1992) (ac-
knowledging relevance of implicit or explicit standards, but noting that procedural safeguards 
are more important); see also Boehl v. Sabre Jet Room, Inc., 349 P.2d 585, 589-90 (Alaska 1960) 
(focusing on standards rather than safeguards). 
164. See State v. Campbell, 617 A.2d 889, 895 (Conn. 1992) (stating standards must be "as 
definit[e] as is reasonably practicable under the circumstances") (citation omitted). 
165. See Atlantis I Condominium Ass'n v. Bryson, 403 A.2d 711, 713 (Del. 1979) (looking to 
tetality of protections against administrative arbitrariness, including both standards and 
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Georgia (S),166 Hawaii (N),167 Idaho (S),168 Indiana (S),169 Kansas (N),170 
Louisiana (S), 171 Maine (S), 172 Michigan (S), 173 Minnesota (S), 174 Mis-
sissippi (G),175 Missouri (S), 176 New Jersey (S),177 North Carolina (G),178 
safeguards created by the legislature or the agency) (citing Meyer v. Lord, 586 P.2d 367, 371 
(Or. Ct. App. 1978)). 
166. See Department of Transp. v. City of Atlanta, 398 S.E.2d 567, 571-72 (Ga. 1990) 
(requiring sufficient standards, such as a "public interest'' standard, to meet constitutional 
delegation). 
167. See In re Kauai Elec. Div., 590 P.2d 524, 534-35 (Haw. 1978) (upholding ·~ust and 
reasonable" rate standard as adequate standard to meet constitutional nondelegation test). 
168. See State v. Kellogg, 568 P.2d 514, 517-18 (Idaho 1977) (upholding delegation to the 
Board of Pharmacy to regulate prescription drug dispensing "in the interest of public health and 
safety,'' but observing that there exists a point at which it is "unreasonable and impracticable" 
for the legislature to fix specific rules); see also Sun Valley Co. v. City of Sun Valley, 708 P.2d 
147, 150-51 (Idaho 1985) (noting that standards are not necessary where legislature has not 
delegated legislative authority to the executive, but that normally both standards and safe-
guards are necessary). 
169. See Meier v. American Maize-Products Co., 645 N.E.2d 662, 671 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) 
(holding standards necessary, but precision will vary with context); Steup v. Indiana Haus. Fin. 
Auth., 402 N.E.2d 1215, 1228 (Ind. 1980) (observing that legislature may set terms very broadly, 
but adding "[s]uch terms get precision from the knowledge and experience of [persons] whose 
duty it is to administer the statutes, and then such statutes become reasonably certain guides in 
carrying out the will and intent of the Legislature"). 
170. See State ex rel. Tomasic v. Unified Gov't, 955 P.2d 1136, 1148 (Kan. 1998) (noting 
legislature can delegate administrative power but not legislative power, and that such delega-
tion must contain "sufficient policies and standards to guide the nonlegislative body in exercis-
ing the delegated power'); Vakas v. Kansas Bd. of Healing Arts, 808 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Kan. 1991) 
(holding legislature is only required to set forth standard in general terms, although courts 
should also look te entirety of statute and procedural safeguards). 
171. See State v. All Pro Paint & Body Shop, Inc., 639 So.2d 707, 716-17 (La. 1994) (noting 
that "regard must be given to the purpose and scope of the act, the subject matters covered 
therein, the duties prescribed, and the broad or narrow powers granted," but that "the stan-
dards which must accompany delegations must not be unlimited, unreasonable, or permit 
arbitrary action by the administrative body'); State v. Broom, 439 So.2d 357, 362 (La. 1983) 
(guiding statutory standards are relevant, but should be de-emphasized in favor of procedural 
safeguards). 
172. See Stato v. Boynton, 379 A.2d 994, 995 (Me. 1977) (finding precise standards neces-
sary, but where not practicable, procedural safeguards may substantially compensate for lack of 
standards). 
173. See People v. Turman, 340 N.W.2d 620, 623 (Mich. 1983) (requiring statutory standard 
to be "as reasonably precise as the subject matter requires or permits,'' although the precision of 
the standard "will vary with the complexity and/or the degree to which subject regulated will 
require constantly changing regulation") (citations omitted). 
174. See Minnesota Energy & Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Printy, 351 N.W.2d 319, 350-51 (Minn. 
1984) (requiring administrative standards or statutory standards to limit discretion). 
175. See State ex rel. Patterson v. Land, 95 So.2d 764, 777 (Miss. 1957) (holding that a 
statute must "reasonably define" the area in which the agency operates and limitations upon its 
power). 
176. See Menorah Med. Ctr. v. Health & Educ. Facility Auth., 584 S.W.2d 73, 83-84 (Mo. 
1979) (en bane) (noting general rule that standards are required to guide agency discretion, but 
exceptions apply where it is impracticable, where delegation relates to protection of public 
morals, health, safety, and general welfare, or where personal fitness is a factor for agency 
consideration). 
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North Dakota (N),179 Rhode Island (G),180 Tennessee (S),181 Vermont 
(S), 182 and Wyoming (S).183 While none of these states allow delegation 
with procedural safeguards alone, at a minimum, general legislative 
statements of policy or legislative statements of policy with proce-
dural safeguards are required for a valid delegation. I will refer to 
them as the "moderate" nondelegation states for purposes of analysis. 
Arguably, some of these moderate states take a similar approach in 
doctrine to federal courts. Despite the doctrinal similarities, though, 
these state courts are much more likely to strike down statutes as 
unconstitutional than their federal counterparts. Thus, although 
there may be doctrinal similarities, there are differences in the en-
forcement levels between the federal system and moderate nondelega-
tion states. 
177. See Township of Mount Laurel v. Department of the Pub. Advocate, 416 A.2d 886, 891· 
92 (N.J. 1980) (allowing standards accompanying delegation to be "quite general" or even 
implied, and upholding delegation to agency to determine what was in the public interest 
because of existing court decisions defining "public interest"). 
178. See Town of Spruce Pine v. Avery County, 488 S.E.2d 144, 146-47 (N.C. 1997) (obser· 
ving that both standards and safeguards are present); Adams v. North Carolina Dep't of Natural 
Resources, 249 S.E.2d 402, 410-11 (N.C. 1978) (noting that in searching for an "adequate 
guiding standard" court can consider whether there are procedural safeguards). 
179. See Trinity Med. Ctr. v. North Dakota Bd. of Nursing, 399 N.W.2d 835, 841-46 (N.D. 
1987) (requiring statute to set forth reasonably clear guidelines within which agency fact finding 
power is to be exercised). 
180. See Marran v. Baird, 635 A.2d 1174, 1179 (R.I. 1994) (noting that a delegation is 
constitutional "[a]s long as the Legislature that creates the agency demonstrates standards or 
principles to confine and guide the agency's power"); Bourque v. Dettore, 589 A.2d 815, 818 (R.I. 
1991) (noting that constitutionality of delegation depends upon "the specificity of the functions 
delegated, the standards accompanying the delegation, and the safeguards against administra-
tive abuse" and that either standards or procedures to confine and guide the agency's discretion 
can suffice). 
181. See West v. Tennessee Rous. Dev. Agency, 512 S.W.2d 275, 281 (Tenn. 1974) (ex· 
plaining that where highly detailed determinations need to be made by agency, greater leeway 
in delegation allowed). 
182. See Rogers v. Watson, 594 A.2d 409, 414 (Vt. 1991) (requiring statute to contain "basic 
standard" to guide the agency). 
183. See In re Bessemer Mt., 856 P.2d 450, 454 (Wyo. 1993) (holding when legislature 
delegated power to an agency with only very broad standards, the agency must "invoke exper-
tise to create standards, which will furnish notice to the public of how the decision may be 
reached"). 
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Table 1 
State Judicial Approaches to the Nondelegation Doctrine 
Weak (Davis- Moderate (legislative Strong (specific standards in 
procedural safe- statement of policy) legislation) 
guard alone) 
Arkansas (S) Alabama (S) Arizona (S) 
California (S) Alaska (N) Florida (S) 
Iowa (S) Colorado (S) Illinois (S) 
Maryland (S) Connecticut(G) Kentucky (S) 
Oregon (S) Delaware (N) Massachusetts (S) 
Washington (N) Georgia (S) Montana (S) 
Wisconsin(N) Hawaii (N) Nebraska (S) 
Idaho (S) Nevada (S) 
Indiana (S) New Hampshire (G) 
Kansas (N) New Mexico (S) 
Louisiana (S) NewYork(N) 
Maine (S) Ohio (N) 
Michigan (S) Oklahoma (S) 
Minnesota (S) Pennsylvania (N) 
Mississippi (G) South Dakota (G) 
Missouri (S) South Carolina (S) 
New Jersey (S) Texas (S) 
North Carolina (G) Utah (S) 
North Dakota (N) Virginia (S) 
Rhode Island (G) West Virginia (S) 
Tennessee (S) 
Vermont (S) 
Wyoming (S) 
C. Rules Review and Separation of Powers in the States 
While the nondelegation doctrine places limits on legislative 
delegation of authority to agencies, Chadha restricts the U.S. Con-
gress's review of otherwise valid delegations. Legislative review of 
rulemaking and other agency action takes on many forms in the 
states, and is often built into state Administrative Procedure Acts 
("AP As") or separate statutes defining a legislative rules review proc-
ess. Although some states provide for a one or two chamber veto, 
similar to that at issue in Chadha, in many states, legislative review 
of rules takes on a slightly different form. Often, a rules review com-
mittee within the legislature has the power to veto, suspend, or delay 
rules or the power to allow proposed rules to lapse absent approval, 
making legislative committee approval of rules a mandatory require-
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ment in the rulemaking process.184 In some states, like Florida, a 
joint committee is assigned responsibility to review all agency rules, 
but its role is almost entirely advisory.185 
As Arthur Bonfield notes, "in the absence of a constitutional 
provision expressly authorizing such action, nonstatutory legislative 
vetoes or suspensions of particular agency rules are probably imper-
missible under most state constitutions."186 As a matter of state con-
stitutional doctrine, Bonfield accurately describes the predominant 
approach of state courts in approaching the doctrine. With few excep-
tions, state court opinions addressing the constitutionality of legisla-
tive veto and mandatory legislative committee approval of rules en-
dorse the formalism of the Chadha court and hold the practice 
unconstitutional. Although a few states have special constitutional 
authorization for the legislative veto187 or joint resolution188 oversight 
of agency rulemaking, the full one or two house legislative veto, as in 
184. For a description of various states' approaches, see L. Harold Levinson, Legislative 
and Executive Veto of Rules of Administrative Agencies: Models and Alternatives, 24 WM. & 
MARYL. REV. 79 (1982); NAARR, supra note 98. 
185. Florida's Joint Administrative Procedures Committee ("JAPC'') reviews all proposed 
rules for purposes of determining whether the rule comports with prescribed standards, includ-
ing whether the rule is "necessary to accomplish the apparent or expressed objectives of the 
specific provision oflaw which the rule implements." FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 120.545(1) (West 1996) 
(amended 1996). JAPC can object to rules, but its objection is not binding on the agency. An 
agency may refuse to comply with JAPC's recommendations. However, agency failure to 
respond at all to a JAPC objection within a period of 30 or 45 days, depending on whether the 
agency is a collegial body, constitutes withdrawal of the rule. See id. § 120.545(6). 
186. ARTHUR EARL BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING § 8.3.2, at 498 (1986). 
187. Iowa's Constitution contains a provision that expressly authorizes its General Assem-
bly to overcome an agency rule by joint resolution. See IOWA CONST. art. ill, § 40; see also Iowa 
Fed'n of Labor v. Department of Job Serv., 427 N.W.2d 443, 445·48 (Iowa 1988) (reconciling 
Iowa's constitutional provision with the power of courts to interpret and declare laws invalid). 
Connecticut's Constitution provides that administrative regulations of the executive department 
may be disapproved by the general assembly or a committee thereof in such a manner as shall 
by law be prescribed. See CONN. CONST. art. 2. See also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§§ 4-170, 4-171 
(West 1998). Nevada's Constitution, amended in 1996, also authorizes a legislative committee 
to suspend agency regulations. See NEV. CONST. art. 3, § 1. 
188. South Carolina's Constitution, article III, section 18, allows joint resolutions to have 
the force and effect of laws. A state Attorney General opinion held the veto process constitu-
tional, on the grounds that article III, section 18, of South Carolina's Constitution provides that 
joint resolutions have the force of law. See 1986 S.C. Op. Att'y Gen. 238. Before this amend· 
ment was added to South Carolina's Constitution, joint resolution veto had been found unconsti· 
tutional. See Reith v. South Carolina State Rous. Auth. (S.C. Ct. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 
225 S.E.2d 847 (S.C. 1976) (holding concurrent resolution approval of rules unconstitutional 
because it interferes with the executive's obligation to enforce the law, but the appellate court 
held the offending clause non-severable and declared the entire statute unenforceable). In 1996, 
Nevada amended its constitution to allow nullification of agency regulations by majority vote of 
its legislative body. See NEV. CONST. art. 3, § 1. In 1992, New Jersey amended its constitution, 
authorizing legislative invalidation of rules by concurrent resolution. See N.J. CONST. art. 5, 
§ 4,, 6 (1999). 
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Chadha, has been held unconstitutional in every state to consider this 
issue, with the singular exception of Idaho.189 
A similar, perhaps more prevalent, form of rules review is the 
"mandatory approval" rules review committee-a committee comprised 
of legislators or individuals appointed by the legislature that has true 
authority to veto rules without going through either or both cham-
bers. Such review has been held unconstitutional in almost every 
state considering the issue. Courts in New Hampshire, Oregon, Ken-
tucky, and West Virginia have found the practice to be unconstitu-
tional.190 A couple of states, such as Michigan191 and South Dakota192 
have express constitutional provisions that authorize suspension of 
agency rules by a designated legislative committee, but only on a 
temporary basis when the legislature is not in session. Wisconsin 
stands alone in concluding the practice is constitutional, although its 
189. Of states addressing the constitutionality of the legislative veto, courts in Alaska, 
Kansas, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia have found the veto unconstitutional. 
See State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769, 777-78 (Alaska 1980) (rejecting the argument 
that the legislature could condition its delegation of rulemaking authority to agencies by 
reserving a veto itself, holding that this violated the separation of powers provision in Alaska's 
constitution); State ex rel. Stephen v. Kansas House of Representatives, 687 P.2d 622, 637-38 
(Kan. 1984) (holding that concurrent resolution legislative veto violates separation of powers 
and presentment requirements in Kansas' Constitution); General Assembly v. Byrne, 448 A.2d 
438, 439 (N.J. 1982) (holding joint resolution veto unconstitutional on separation of powers 
grounds because it "excessively interfere[d] with the functions of the executive branch ... by 
impeding the Executive in its constitutional mandate to faithfully execute the law ... [and] by 
allowing the Legislature te effectively amend or repeal existing laws without participation by 
the Governor"); Commonwealth v. Sessoms, 532 A.2d 775, 780-81 (Pa. 1987) (holding concurrent 
resolution veto unconstitutional as applied to administrative rulemaking, which is essentially 
executive in nature); State ex rel. Barker v. Manchin, 279 S.E.2d 622, 632-36 (JV. Va. 1981) 
(observing that legislative review process, which made available full legislature's review of 
rules, abrogated the veto power of the governor and usurped the traditional executive role). 
190. The committee veto has been addressed in several cases, including: Legislative 
Research Comm'n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 920 (Ky. 1984) (holding unconstitutional, on 
bicameralism and presentment grounds, statutes that give the Legislative Research Commis-
sion the power to approve rules in advance of final adoption and to suspend them for periods in 
between legislative sessions); Missouri, discussed infra; Michigan, discussed infra; Opinion of 
the Justices, 431 A.2d 783, 788 (N.H. 1981) (advisory opinion) (declaring unconstitutional 
proposed legislation that would require agency rules to be submitted to a standing committee in 
each house of the legislature, on the grounds that the legislature cannot delegate lawmaking 
authority to a smaller body); Gilliam County v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 849 P.2d 500, 505 
(Ore. 1993) (en bane) (holding unconstitutional legislative committee power to veto rules); 
Manchin, 279 S.E.2d at 636 (invalidating mandatory review of rules, subject to veto, by the 
Legislative Rule-Making Review Committee, a body composed of twelve legislators); State ex rel. 
Meadows v. Hechler, 462 S.E.2d 586, 594 (JV. Va. 1995) (holding unconstitutional similar 
committee suspension process). 
191. See MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 37 (providing for joint committee suspension of rnles on a 
temporary basis); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 24.235 (amended 1995), 24.236 (!Nest 
1994). 
192. See S.D. CONST. art. III, § 30 (providing for joint committee suspension of rules on a 
temporary basis). 
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legislative review process provides for temporary committee suspen-
sion only.193 
Cases decided recently in Missouri and Michigan illustrate 
how the approach of Chadha is alive and well in some states as a 
restriction on legislative oversight of agency rulemaking. In both 
contexts, the state court, like the U.S. Supreme Court in Chadha, 
followed a formalistic textual interpretation of the applicable state 
constitution. Yet neither opinion discusses the policy merits or faults 
of the legislative veto, or the institutional differences affecting federal 
and state legislative oversight of agency rulemaking. 
The Missouri Supreme Court recently struck down a suspen-
sion of agency proposed rules by the state's Joint Committee on Ad-
ministrative Rules (JCAR), which was formed in 1975.194 JCAR, 
whose veto mechanism had been the subject of scholarly criticism,195 
is composed of five senators appointed by the president pro tern of the 
Senate and five representatives appointed by the speaker of the 
House.196 Initially JCAR reviewed rules and reported findings and 
recommendations to the General Assembly, the Commissioner of 
Administration, and the elected state officer who promulgated the 
rule. Subsequent legislation authorized JCAR to suspend rules,197 
granted the right to prior approval of rules, 198 and established the 
power to nullify rules already in effect. 199 
The 1997 challenge to JCAR's authority involved rules pro-
posed by Department of Natural Resources (''DNR'') in implementing 
193. See infra notes 238-44 and accompanying text. Pennsylvania has refused to hold 
unconstitutional its committee review process, which allows an objecting committee to bar 
publication of final regulations. See generally Department of Envtl. Resources v. Jubelirer, 614 
A.2d 204 (Pa. 1992). 
194. See Missouri Coalition for the Env't v. Joint Comm. on Admin. Rules, 948 S.W.2d 125, 
128 (Mo. 1997) (en bane). Following this case, the Missouri Legislature amended its legislative 
review process to comply with its constitution. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 536.028 (West Supp. 
1999). 
195. See Kenneth D. Dean, Legislative Veto of Administrative Rules in Missouri: A Consti-
tutional Virus, 57 Mo. L. REV. 1157, 1216 (1992) (concluding that Missouri's legislative veto and 
suspension mechanisms "are especially likely to be declared unconstitutional because they 
involve powers exercised by a committee''); Scott Welman, Comment, Joint Committee on 
Administrative Rules: The Missouri Legislature's Disregard for the Missouri Constitution, 58 
UMKC L. REV. 115, 126 (1989) (suggesting Missouri's legislative veto is unconstitutional). 
196. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 536.037 (West 1988) (amended 1994) (creating the committee 
and outlining its membership). 
197. See § 173.612 (amended 1991) (authorizing JCAR to suspend rules promulgated by the 
state department of education). See also Dean, supra note 195, at 1217-23. 
198. See, e.g., § 197.445 (amended 1993, 1995, 1997) (preventing the state department of 
health services from adopting a rule unless promulgated according to JCAR). 
199. See, e.g., § 277.160 (amended 1993, 1995). See also Deau, supra note 195, at 1224-31. 
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Missouri's Solid Waste Management Law (''MSWML"). Under the 
rules review process, the DNR was required to submit proposed rules 
to JCAR when it submitted its proposed rules to the secretary of state 
for notice and comment publication.200 JCAR could disapprove such a 
rule,201 but if it failed to suspend the rule within twenty days, the rule 
was deemed approved by JCAR and the agency was permitted to 
submit the rule for final publication. 202 Certain rules, such as those 
promulgated under MSWML, could be suspended after publication at 
any time by JCAR.203 
Despite Missouri case law acknowledging that complete sepa-
ration of powers is not always required,204 the court reasoned that 
Missouri's statute authorizing JCAR to veto DNR's solid waste rules 
was unconstitutional because it interfered with executive branch 
powers and circumvented the Missouri Constitution's bill passage and 
presentment requirements.205 To begin, echoing the Chadha majority, 
the court reasoned, that Missouri's Constitution confines the power of 
its legislature to enacting laws and does not allow the legislature to 
execute laws already enacted. JCAR's veto of DNR's solid waste rules 
violated this provision to the extent it suspended promulgation of 
DNR rules pending JCAR review, prevented promulgation and en-
forcement of the rules JCAR disapproves, and permitted JCAR to 
suspend and withdraw rules already promulgated by DNR. Although 
the court noted that the legislature may attempt to control the execu-
tive branch either by passing amendments or other legislation subject 
to the governor's veto, by appropriation, by committee hearings, in-
vestigations, or information requests, JCAR's veto effectively worked 
as a "unilateral control," which is constitutionally prohibited.206 Also 
echoing Chadha, the court observed, the Missouri Constitution's 
passage and presentment requirements form a barrier to the constitu-
200. See§ 260.225.4, 536.024 (West Supp. 1999). 
201. See id. 
202. See § 260.225.3. 
203. See § 260.255.4. 
204. See generally Rhodes v. Bell, 130 S.W. 465 (Mo. 1910); Albright v. Fisher, 64 S.W. 106 
(Mo. 1901) (holding that a circuit court has no authority to entertain a suit to restrain a city 
municipal assembly from passing a right·of-way ordinance). 
205. The Missouri Constitution contains a strict separation of powers clause, which states: 
The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct-departments 
the legislative, executive, and judicial-each of which shall be confided to a 
separate magistracy, and no person, or collection of persons, charged with 
the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of those departments shall 
exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except in the 
instances in this constitution expressly directed or permitted. 
Mo. CONST. art II, § 1. 
206. See Missouri Coalition, 948 S.W.2d at 133-34. 
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tionality of JCAR's veto.207 Missouri's constitution provides, "[n]o law 
shall be passed [by the legislature] except by bill .... "208 And every 
bill that passes Missouri's House of Representatives and Senate must 
be presented to and approved by the Governor prior to becoming 
law.209 
Michigan reached a remarkably similar result, relying on its 
presentment clause as much as separatio~ doctrines, when it ad-
dressed the constitutionality of joint legislative committee review and 
suspension of rules. In 1997, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that 
the sections of Michigan's APA, which give the legislature's Joint 
Committee on Administrative Rules ("JCAR") the authority to veto 
administrative rules, violates the enactment and presentment clauses 
of Michigan's Constitution, and thus runs afoul of separation of pow-
ers principles. 210 
JCAR is a committee comprised of five members of the House 
of Representatives and five members of the Senate. Sections 45 and 
46 of Michigan's AP A required agencies to submit a rule to JCAR for 
its approval and obtain a certificate of approval prior to transmission 
of rules to the Secretary of State for publication.211 Once JCAR disap-
proved a rule, Michigan's APA prohibited the agency from adopting 
the rule unless the legislature, by concurrent resolution, approved the 
rule or JCAR subsequently approved the rule. 212 
JCAR's approval process was held unconstitutional by the 
Michigan Court of Appeals. 213 After referencing an Alaska case that 
held joint resolution annulment of rules unconstitutional and New 
Hampshire and West Virginia cases that held joint committee veto of 
rules unconstitutional,214 the court addressed whether Michigan's 
provision violated separation of power principles.215 Although Michi-
gan's Constitution contains an explicit strict separation of powers 
provision, the court reasoned that sections 45 and 46 of Michigan's 
APA were problematic primarily because they violated the enactment 
207. See id. at 134·35. 
208. Mo. CONST. art. III, § 21. 
209. See id. § 31. 
210. See Blank v. Department of Corrections, 564 N.W.2d 130, 132-33 (Mich. Ct. Apps. 
1997). 
211. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§§ 24.245, 24.246(1) (West 1994). 
212. See id. § 24.245(9)(a)-(b). 
213. See Blank, 564 N.W.2d at 141. 
214. State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1980); Opinion of the Justices, 431 
A.2d 783 (N.H. 1981); State ex rel. Barker v. Manchin, 279 S.E.2d 622 (W. Va. 1981)). 
215. See id. at 137-38. 
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and presentation requirements of Michigan's Constitution.216 The 
court found that the provisions violated enactment requirements 
because they did not require the legislature to undergo the require-
ments of the constitution prior to enacting a law.217 Michigan's Con-
stitution provides that "[t]he legislative power of the State of Michi-
gan is vested in a senate and a house of representatives"218 and that 
"[a]ll legislation shall be by bill and may originate in either house."219 
Further, it requires the concurrence of a majority of the members of 
each house prior to becoming law.220 The provisions were found to 
violate presentation provisions to the extent that they bypassed the 
participation of Michigan's Governor in the lawmaking process. Un-
der Michigan's Constitution, "[e]very bill passed by the legislature 
shall be presented to the governor before it becomes a law .... "221 As 
the court observed, "[b ]y giving JCAR the authority to veto adminis-
trative rules proposed by an executive agency, the Legislature has 
delegated legislative power to a smaller legislative body that can 
effectively negate a valid action of an agency without following the 
requirements [of the constitution]."222 
Three things about the Michigan case are notable. First, the 
court reasoned that agency promulgation of rules is not a legislative 
function, but by implication is executive in nature. 223 Although the 
outcome of the case probably would not have been different had the 
court deemed rulemaking a legislative function, this may work to save 
programs similar to Michigan's in other states. Second, the court 
observed that by violating the Michigan Constitution's enactment and 
presentment clauses, the JCAR approval process implicitly violated 
separation of powers.224 Even in states like Michigan, which has an 
explicit strict separation of powers provision in its constitution, courts 
will look to other requirements the constitution imposes on the law-
making process. Third, the court observed that, even without the 
JCAR veto, Michigan retained a ''legislative disapproval process" -
allowing the legislature, by joint resolution, to send a message of 
216. See id. 
217. See id. at 135. 
218. MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
219. Id. § 22. 
220. See id. § 26. 
221. Id. § 33. 
222. Blank, 564 N.W.2d at 136. 
223. See id. (citing Westervelt v. Natural Resources Comm'n, 263 N.W.2d 564, 576-77 
(Mich. 1978)). 
224. See id. (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946 (1983) (stating enactment and presen-
tation clauses "are integral parts of the constitutional design for the separation of powers'')). 
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disapproval of rules to agencies.225 The court also observed that the 
power of the Michigan Legislature to act in between sessions was 
preserved by joint committee suspension, which Michigan had pro-
vided in its constitution.226 Thus, the legislature has some participa-
tion in agency rulemaking, and agencies are prohibited from passing 
rules when the legislature is not in session. 227 
Unfortunately, state courts adopting a result similar to 
Chadha, such as courts in Missouri and Michigan, provide little more 
than a formalistic rationale for it. The texts of state constitution 
separation of powers clauses are often invoked in the separation of 
powers debate. However, the case law suggests the approach of a 
state court in evaluating rules review is much less likely a result of 
the state constitution's separation of powers clause so much as it is 
dependent on a variety of other formal constitutional and judicial 
factors, including: 1) whether the state's constitution contains bicam-
eralism, or other enactment requirements, 2) whether the state's 
constitution contains a presentment clause, allowing gubernatorial 
participation in lawmaking, 3) whether the state's constitution con-
tains a "take care" clause, and 4) whether rulemaking is considered to 
be an executive or legislative function within the state. The courts 
may also consider whether a rule is regarded with coequal status as a 
''law" within the state and how the state's executive branch is struc-
tured. With respect to each of these doctrinal factors, there is a con-
vergence among the state approaches, although differences among 
some states render in question the constitutional status of at least 
some state approaches to rules review. 
As with the Supreme Court's Chadha opinion, functional and 
policy rationales are given short shrift by state courts addressing 
225. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 24.251(West1994). 
226. The Michigan Constitution provides: 
The legislature may by concurrent resolution empower a joint committee of 
the legislature, acting between sessions, to suspend any rule or regulation 
promulgated by an administrative agency subsequent to the adjournment of 
the last preceding regular legislative session. Such suspension shall con-
tinue no longer than the end of the next regular legislative session. 
MICH. CONST. art.IV, § 37. This provision was added to Michigan's Constitution in 1961 in 
response to a 1958 Attorney General opinion that administrative rules could not be suspended 
by the Legislature under Michigan's constitution without passing a bill that becomes law. See 
Blank, 564 N.W.2d at 137. 
227. The Michigan Court of Appeals acknowledged this again in a recent case applying 
Blank. In Michigan State Employees Association v. Michigan Liquor Control Commission, 591 
N.W.2d 353, 358 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998), the court observed that the Legislature retains authority 
to suspend rules by concurrent resolution in between legislative sessions. 
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limits on legislative oversight. Such rationales, if addressed by the 
courts, would have given some normative basis for the decisions, as 
there are several policy rationales against legislative veto of agency 
rulemaking. For example, the political scientist Marcus Ethridge 
conducted a study of Michigan's rules review process and its impact 
on environmental policymaking in the late 1970s.228 His study chroni-
cled some of the extreme problems posed by such a review process. 
During the period Ethridge studied, Michigan's committee spent most 
of its time evaluating complaints about regulatory policy raised by the 
public, not engaging in "traditional" oversight-i.e., monitoring policy 
for efficiency or evaluating whether policy contradicts legislative 
intent. It was noted that "the most obvious regularity in committee 
discussions is a general predisposition to support agency decisions 
that can be reasonably interpreted as a good faith compromise be-
tween opposing viewpoints."229 This led to notable frustration among 
agency administrators. Based on a study of regulatory aggressiveness 
and stringency from November 1977 to July 1980, Ethridge concluded 
that agencies with high degrees of access to regulated interests (such 
as licensing boards) were less likely to have rules disapproved. By 
contrast, rules review had a high impact on environmental policy-
making, where regulated interests complained regularly, inviting 
JCAR to second-guess agency decisions on political grounds.230 This is 
part of the concern that separation of powers principles have evolved 
to guard against, although this functional rationale received little or 
no discussion by the Missouri or Michigan courts. 
While there appears to be some doctrinal consensus among the 
states in addressing the issue of the legislative veto and mandatory 
committee approval of rules, not all states converge in their result. 
Courts in Idaho and Wisconsin have explicitly authorized stronger 
legislative oversight than other states. In Mead v. Arnell, a majority 
of the Idaho Supreme Court held that suspension of rules by concur-
rent resolution, in circumstances where the legislature believes the 
rules are inconsistent with the statute on which those rules are based, 
is constitutional. 231 This is the only case that has held that a two-
house legislative veto is valid in the absence of an express constitu-
tional provision authorizing the device. 232 
228. MARCUS E. ETHRIDGE, LEGISLATIVE PARTICIPATION IN IMPLEMENTATION: POLICY 
THROUGH POLITICS 81-98 (1985). 
229. Id. at 86. 
230. See id. at 86-87. 
231. Mead v. Arnell, 791 P.2d 410, 418-20 (Idaho 1990). 
232. The New Hampshire Supreme Court, in an advisory opinion, has suggested that the 
legislative veto may survive constitutional muster. See Opinion of the Justices, 431 A.2d 783, 
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While it is the best opinion advocates of strong legislative 
oversight probably have, the case is also difficult to follow and prob-
lematic. The court noted under Idaho's Constitution, only the legisla-
ture "has the power to make law," and that "a statute or law" may ''be 
enacted only by a bill, passed by both houses of the legislature and 
signed by the governor, or rejected by the governor, [and] passed over 
the veto by the legislature."233 The opinion observed, however, that 
adoption or rescission of executive rules is not subject to this require-
. ment because this applies only to statutory laws. Agency rules, al-
though they may have the "force and effect of law" are not "equal in 
dignity or status to statutory law."234 In addition, the court rejected 
the argnment that concurrent resolution veto usurps the executive 
function or interferes with the "constitutionally mandated duty [of the 
executive] to execute the laws of this state."235 Despite dicta declaring 
the veto constitutional, the court held the particular legislative veto at 
issue in the case unconstitutional because the legislature had failed to 
state explicitly, as the statute required, the grounds for issuing the 
veto. 
The case is important because it illustrates how, in some 
states, concurrent resolution legislative veto may be constitutional. 
Although it addresses concurrent resolution and not the one-house 
veto, the opinion's reasoning echoes Justice White's dissent in INS v. 
Chadha. Justice White would have upheld the legislative veto as "the 
most effective if not the only means to insure [Congress's] role as the 
nation's lawmakers."236 Justice White found legislative delegation to 
executive branch agencies without retaining a veto over agency rules 
"risk[ing] unaccountable policymaking by those not elected to fill that 
role."237 Like Woodrow Wilson, Justice White thought that the in-
creased legislative tendency to delegate to agencies demanded crea-
tive legislative responses, such as the veto, designed to ensure that 
the legislature continued to reign supreme in the lawmaking process. 
A Wisconsin statute authorizing a legislative committee to 
suspend a rule temporarily, pending prompt action by both houses of 
787 (N.H. 1981) (stating in dicta that the legislative veto may not be unconstitutional, because 
the legislature can condition its delegation of lawmaking authority on some form of legislative 
approval). 
233. Mead, 791 P.2d at 414. 
234. Id. at 415. 
235. Id. at 417. 
236. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 978 (1983) (White, J., dissenting). 
237. Id. at 968. 
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the legislature and presentment to the governor for signing or veto, 
has also been held constitutional. The challenged process allowed 
Wisconsin's Joint Committee for Review of Administrative Rules 
("JCRAR''), consisting of five senators and five representatives ap-
pointed by the legislative leadership, to temporarily suspend rules for 
very specific grounds.238 Within 30 days of suspension, Wisconsin's 
JCRAR was required to introduce into each house of the legislature a 
bill to repeal the suspended rule, for consideration at any regular 
session.239 Suspension, however, is very limited: ''If both bills ... are 
defeated, or fail to be enacted in any other manner [including by veto 
of the governor], the rule remains in effect and the committee may not 
suspend it again."240 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, without a single dissent, held 
this process constitutional, but it stressed the temporary and limited 
nature of the committee's action.241 The court noted that it interprets 
the separation of powers principles contained in the Wisconsin Con-
stitution, which are implicit, more liberally than those states with 
express separation of powers provisions. 242 In Wisconsin, sharing of 
powers between the legislative and executive branches is acceptable 
so long as it does not disturb "the balance between the three branches 
of government." interfere with "their respective independence and 
integrity," or cause "concentration of unchecked power in the hands of 
any one branch."243 The court reasoned that the process did not vio-
late Wisconsin's bicameralism and presentment provisions because 
"only the formal bicameral enactment process coupled with executive 
action can make permanent a rule suspension."244 
Although the challenged Wisconsin process is more tempered 
than Idaho's, and the Supreme Court decision is much more circum-
238. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 227.26 (West 1994). The grounds for suspending a rule in 
Wisconsin at the time included: absence of statutory authority; an emergency relating to the 
public health, safety, or welfare; a failure to comply with legislative intent; a conflict with state 
law; a change in circumstance since enactment of the law upon which the rule is based; arbi· 
trariness and capriciousness; or imposition of an undue hardship. See id.§ 227.19(4)(d). 
239. See id. § 227.26(f). 
240. Id. § 227.26(2)(i). Article V, § 10 of the Wisconsin Constitution authorizes the Gover-
nor to veto legislation. WIS. CONST. art. V, § 10. 
241. See Martinez v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 478 N.W.2d 582, 
586-87 (Wis. 1992). In an advisory opinion, the New Hampshire Supreme Court, expressed 
some agreement with this view. See Opinion of the Justices, 431 A.2d 783, 789 (N.H. 1981) 
(declaring unconstitutional proposed legislation that would require agency rules to be submitted 
to a standing committee in each house of the legislature, but stating that a committee might be 
permitted to temporarily suspend a rule when the legislature is not in session to allow the 
legislature time to enact a bill). 
242. See Martinez, 478 N.W.2d at 587. 
243. Id. at 585. 
244. Id. at 586. 
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spect, it is still doctrinally problematic, and thus probably cannot be 
generalized. According to Arthur Bonfield: 
The reasoning and result of this Wisconsin case are questionable, since a tem-
porary suspension amounts to a change in the law for the period in question 
without satisfaction of the bicameralism and the presentment requirements of 
the state constitution. Furthermore, the lack of express separation of powers 
provisions in the Wisconsin Constitution does not appear to justify different 
results in this cases as compared to the many state cases ... that hold state 
legislative vetoes of various kinds invalid under their state constitutions be-
cause the Wisconsin Constitution's structure seems to incorporate in other 
ways, as the court in this case recognized, the same separation of powers prin-
ciples contained in the more explicit constitutional provisions of other 
states.245 
While the court attempted to address some of Bonfield's concern about 
changing law by suggesting that Wisconsin, like Idaho, recognizes a 
distinction between rules, which merely have the force and effect of 
laws, and legislation, which is always subject to bicameral passage 
and presentment, this distinction is not universally accepted by state 
or federal courts. 24s 
A message one might take from the 1997 decisions in Missouri 
and Michigan, as well as the doctrinal weight of other state court 
decisions that have addressed this issue, is that the future of legisla-
tive rules review-particularly where there is a veto and the state has 
no explicit constitutional authorization-is bleak. This is consistent 
with Bonfield's description of the doctrine, but the story in practice 
may not be quite that simple. Some state court opinions, such as 
those in Idaho and Wisconsin, endorse strong legislative oversight. In 
other states, however, informal factors related to the politics of state 
legislatures may lead to underenforcement of this separation of pow-
ers limitation. 
As an illustration of the underenforcement of constitutional 
restrictions on legislative oversight of rulemaking, consider a recent 
challenge in North Carolina. Like Michigan and Missouri, North 
245. ARTHUR EARL BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING § 8.3.2(c), at 192 
(Supp. 1993). 
246. For example, a different doctrinal tact that may bring about the same result is to 
define rulemaking as an executive function. For instance, Kansas distinguishes between the 
promulgation of rules and regulations, which is "essentially executive or administrative in 
nature, not legislative" and the modifying or revoking of rules, which is "essentially legislative." 
State ex rel. Stephan v. Kansas House of Representatives, 687 P.2d 622, 635, 638 (Kan. 1984). 
In addition, as is noted above, Michigan defines rulemaking as an executive function. See supra 
note 223 and accompanying text. 
1999] INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 1213 
Carolina recently faced a challenge to its Rules Review Commission, 
an interesting entity comprised of citizens appointed by the legisla-
ture to review rules. In 1995, the North Carolina legislature amended 
its AP A to extend the review authority of its Rules Review Commis-
sion ("Commission"), originally created in 1978, as well as the power 
of its legislature. The Commission, an eight member independent 
"citizens" commission appointed by the North Carolina legislature, 
now has veto power over agency rules. If the Commission does not 
approve an agency rule, the rulemaking process stops and the rule 
cannot go into effect. The grounds for vetoing rules include vague-
ness, lack of authority, and lack of necessity to carry out legislative 
intent. The Commission, which meets once a month, is not subject to 
the restrictions on lobbying or ex parte contacts that normally apply 
to administrative agencies.247 
Between November 30, 1995, the date the 1995 amendments 
became effective, and Summer 1996, approximately 150 rules went 
through this process.248 The vast majority of rules have been ap-
proved without controversy.249 However, the Commission has used its 
authority to veto several controversial rules, sometimes in response to 
political opposition to the rules. For example, in July 1996, the Com-
mission vetoed wetlands rules proposed by the state Environmental 
Management Commission because the Commission believed the rules 
were vague and that the agency was without the statutory authority 
to adopt them, despite the state Attorney General's opinion to the 
contrary.250 More recently, the Commission vetoed a certificate-of-
need process for open-heart surgery centers, opposed by large health 
care interests in the state, and rules restricting sewage from hogs, 
opposed by the strong farming interests in the state. In both in-
stances, representatives of those interests opposed to the rules made 
political appeals directly to the Commission.251 
In addition, under the 1995 amendments, a North Carolina 
legislator may stop the agency rulemaking process by filing a bill to 
stop the process within 30 days of the beginning of the legislative 
session. Once such a bill has been filed, the agency rule cannot take 
effect until the bill passes, the bill is killed, or the session ends with-
247. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-21.12(d) (1995). 
248. This discussion is based on Jack Betts & Maria Henson, Above the Law: How eight 
unelected citizens wield the power to stop state government in its tracks, THE CHARLOTTE 
OBSERVER, Nov. 24, 1996, at Cl. 
249. See id. 
250. See id. 
251. See id. 
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out the bill passing.252 The North Carolina process was challenged in 
1997 on separation of powers grounds by several hospitals that were 
open-heart surgery certificate-of-need applicants.253 The case settled, 
laying the issue at rest in North Carolina for the time being.254 
Like North Carolina, many other states have committee veto 
provisions that allow committees to effectively hold captive adminis-
trative rules without full legislative and gubernatorial consideration 
and thus, under a strict application of Chadha's formalistic analysis, 
raise separation of powers problems. Pennsylvania's current review 
process allows a legislative committee to bar publication of rules to 
which it objects.255 In addition, Ohio and Oklahoma's legislative re-
view processes allow concurrent resolution veto of administrative 
rules that fail to comply with specific criteria, even though neither 
state's constitution explicitly authorizes unilateral legislative ac-
tion.256 
Even states that do not allow a committee to effectively ''veto" 
or "suspend" agency rules include in their legislative review process 
some requirements that are constitutionally problematic under 
Chadha-like formalistic application of separation of powers jurispru-
dence. Following Chadha's analysis, the recent Missouri case, Coali-
tion for the Environment, suggests that a mandatory twenty-day 
waiting period pending committee review is constitutionally sus-
pect. 257 Several states, including Pennsylvania,258 Alabama,259 
252. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-21.3(b) (1995). 
253. See Betts & Henson, supra note 248 at Cl. 
254. More recently, the North Carolina Pharmacy Board has filed a challenge to the Rules 
Review Commission's rejection of the Board's rule limiting pharmacists' work shifts. See Carol 
Ukens, "North Carolina Board Headed to Court Over R.Ph. Workload Rule," DRUG TOPICS, Feb. 
1, 1999 at 41 (available on LEXIS); 
255. See 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 745.6 (West 1990) (Supp. 1999) (allowing legislative 
committee's disapproval of proposed regulation to bar its promulgation, unless the Attorney 
General certifies the regulation is necessary for public health, safety, or welfare, or otherwise 
required by law). Pennsylvania's objection process contains a review proposal that allows full 
legislative consideration of regulations that have been objected to, but this process is not 
mandatory. If an agency does not avail itself of this process within 40 days, the objected-to rule 
is withdrawn. See id.§ 745.7. 
256. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 101.35 (West Supp. 1994 (Supp. 1999)); OKLA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 75, § 308 (West 1995) (Supp. 1999). 
257. See Missouri Coalition for the Env't. v. Joint Comm. on Admin. Rules, 948 S.W.2d 125, 
136 (Mo. 1997) (en bane) (observing statute is unconstitutional insofar as it allows a joint 
committee "to suspend publication and promulgation [of an agency's] final orders of rule making 
for up to twenty days while the JCAR reviewed such rules"). 
258. See 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 745.5 (West 1990) (Supp. 1999) (suspending rules 
temporarily pending review committee actions). 
259. See ALA. CODE. § 41-22-23(b) (Supp. 1998) (providing that a rule disapproved by 
legislative committee "shall be suspended until the adjourument of the next regular session of 
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Alaska,260 Illinois,261 Iowa,262 Maine,263 and Nevada264 presently allow 
the committee review process or committee objection to delay the 
rulemaking process.265 In addition, in several states committee objec-
tion has the effect of shifting the burdens in a rule challenge pro-
ceeding266 or works to establish presumptive or conclusive evidence of 
legislative intent.267 Although the constitutional problems with such 
provisions-at least on a formalistic reading of separation of powers-
have on occasion been noted,268 to date courts have not held such provi-
sions, standing alone, unconstitutional. Thus, in many states general 
legislative review mechanisms inconsistent with Chadha separation 
of powers analysis apply to agency rulemaking. 
the legislature following the date of disapproval and suspension of the committee or until the 
legislature shall, by joint resolution, revoke the suspension of the committee"). 
260. See ALASKA STAT. § 24.20.445(a) (Michie 1998) (allowing two-thirds vote by committee 
when legislature is not in session to suspend the effectiveness of the adoption of a regulation 
until thirty days after legislature reconvenes). 
261. See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 100/5-110, 100/5-115, 100/5-120 <:Nest Supp. 1999) 
(allowing committee objection to delay rulemaking process). 
262. See IOWA CODE ANN. § l 7A.8 <:Nest Supp. 1999) (allowing two-thirds vote by commit-
tee when legislature is not in session to "delay the effective date of a rule until the adjournment 
of the next regular session of the general assembly''). 
263. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, pt. 18, ch. 375, subch. II-A <:Nest Supp. 1998) (delaying 
adoption of rules pending consideration by legislature). 
264. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 223B.0675 (Michie Supp. 1997) (allowing committee 
objection to delay agency adoption of regulations until thirtieth day of the next regular legisla-
tive session). Nevada appears to have express constitutional authorization for this procedure. 
See NEV. CONST. art. 3, § 1 (1998). 
265. Missouri's new legislative review process, amended in reaction to Missouri Coalition 
for the Environment, also delays the implementation of rules until the expiration of thirty days 
of a legislative session. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 536.028 <:Nest Supp. 1999). 
266. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 541-A:l3.VI (1997) (following committee objection agency 
bears the burden of establishing rule's validity); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-03.3 (Supp. 1999) 
("After the filing of a committee objection, the burden of persuasion is upon the agency in any 
action for judicial review or for enforcement of the rule .... If the agency fails to meet its burden 
of persuasion, the court shall declare the whole or portion of the rule objected to invalid and 
judgment must be rendered against the agency for court costs."); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 842 
(1996) (legislative committee objection results in agency burden of proof that rule is within 
agency's authority, consistent with the intent of the legislature, and not arbitrary). Similarly, 
under the 1981 Model State Administrative Procedure Act, legislative review committee objec-
tion shifts to an agency the burden of establishing "that the whole or portion of the rule objected 
to is within the procedural and substantive authority delegated to the agency." MODEL STATE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AC'!'§ 3-204(d}(5) (1981). 
267. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13A.032 (Michie 1996) (allowing committee objection to 
establish prima facie case of legislative intent in pending rule proceedings, and also establishing 
authority for committee to institute rule challenge in circuit court); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 2-4-
403, 2-4-404 (1997) (allowing committee to poll members of the legislature; establishing conclu-
sive evidence in a rule challenge proceeding that the rule is contrary to legislative intent). 
268. In Eklund v. Eklund, North Dakota Supreme Court Justice Sandstrom observed that 
delegating to a legislative committee the authority to shift the burden of persuasion in court 
cases involving administrative rules is constitutionally problematic on Chadha grounds. 
Eklund v. Eklund, 538 N.W.2d 182, 189 (N.D. 1995) (Sandstrom, J., concurring). 
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Many, but not all, states endorse formal restrictions on the 
legislative veto that are similar to Chadha. Regardless of formal 
restrictions on legislative oversight, informal institutional factors may 
lead to underenforcement of these restrictions in many states. Both 
formal, rule-based doctrines and informal, micropolitical factors influ-
ence how separation of powers works to constrain the participation of 
state legislatures in agency rulemaking. 
IV. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AND 
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
There are many strong similarities between federal and state 
separation of powers doctrines. However, some state approaches to 
separation of powers diverge from the federal approach, much in the 
same manner as Antifederalist and Federalist separation of powers 
ideals. As I suggest in Table 2, federal and many state judicial ap-
proaches differ, in doctrine and enforcement, in the contexts of non-
delegation and limitations on legislative oversight of rulemaking. 
Table 2: 
Comparison of Federal and State Approaches 
Enforcement of Separation Nondelegation Limits Limits on Unilateral Leg-
Of Powers Doctrine islative Oversight 
Federal (more Federalist) Weaker (Davis' proce- Stronger (since Chadha) 
dural safeguards) 
States (more Antifederalist) Stronger (rejection of Weaker(underenforcement 
Davis) in states such as North 
Carolina; doctrinal diver-
gences as in Idaho, Wiscon-
sin; many committee 
waiting periods and burden 
shifting that are suspect 
under Chadha) 
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While the federal approach is consistent with Federalist sepa-
ration of power principles, the approach of many states is Antifeder-
alist in spirit. Like the Antifederalists, many states endorse strict 
separation of functions, as in the strong nondelegation doctrine, or 
excuse legislative supremacy, as is the case with underenforcement of 
Chadha-Iike restrictions on the legislative veto.269 At the same time, 
with the exception of Chadha's formalism (but not Chadha's result), 
Antifederalist ideals are incompatible with the approach of federal 
courts. 
As I will argue in this Part, many states embrace Anti-
federalist principles, but the interpretive practice of state constitu-
tional law has not adequately acknowledged the principles behind this 
legacy, nor has it provided an adequate explanation why they might 
be desirable. Serious study of the unique institutional design of state 
systems of governance, I suggest, is a necessary predicate to the de-
velopment of an independent theory of state separation of powers. 
These institutional factors can explain doctrinal nuances and en-
forcement levels in state separation of powers jurisprudence and 
should be addressed explicitly by state courts addressing separation 
of power issues, especially where they rely on or reason from extra-
jurisdictional authorities. 
A. The Limits of Common American Heritage, Textual, 
and Character Interpretivism 
As an exercise in judicial interpretation, state constitutional-
ism differs significantly from areas such as commercial or property 
law. There are reasons for some strong degree of consistency in the 
commercial and property law contexts, among them the promotion of 
uniformity and certainty in private transactions. Yet state constitu-
tions reflect a variety of historical, institutional, and political vari-
ance.270 At the same time, American law schools, which teach consti-
269. Stanley Friedelbaum, in his recent survey of state separation of powers doctrines 
affecting judicial-political and executive-legislative branch relations, reaches a similar conclu-
sion. See Stanley H. Friedelbaum, State Courts and the Separation of Powers: A Venerable 
Doctrine in Varied Contexts, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1417, 1457 (1998) (observing that state doctrine is 
more "conventional" and ''less likely to embody the permissiveness characteristic of federal 
rulings'). 
270. Mel Eisenberg has identified several values reinforced through articulation of generic 
private common law principles, but stops short of suggesting that these values are also rein· 
forced through elucidation of public common law. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE 
COMMON LAW (1988). His recent work suggests that the emergence of"national" common law is 
consistent with common law decisionmaking within a federalist system. See Melvin A. Eisen· 
berg, Is There a National Common Law?, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 1999). 
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tutional law almost entirely in the context of federal court cases in-
terpreting the U.S. Constitution, reinforce reliance on federal judicial 
authority in interpreting constitutions. Most American lawyers think 
of constitutional law in terms of the categories and doctrines that 
emanate from federal cases. The natural temptation of lawyers and 
state law judges addressing issues of state constitutional law is to rely 
on federal authority. 
Despite this temptation, a court's degree of reliance on federal 
authority in addressing constitutional law often will-and should-vary 
depending on the nature of the issue it is addressing. If a state court 
is addressing an issue to which both the U.S. Constitution and the 
applicable state constitution have applicable clauses-such as free 
speech, free exercise and nonestablishment of religion, or equal pro-
tection-then the court has some obligation to use the federal author-
ity to define the minimum applicable threshold concerning individual 
rights.271 Beyond this legal obligation, state courts in this context 
retain a large degree of interpretive discretion in addressing issues of 
constitutional law. In other contexts-largely issues of structure, such 
as separation of powers-federal constitutional authority does not, as a 
legal matter, compel a minimum result.272 Here, state courts have the 
full range of interpretive discretion at their disposal as they grapple 
with issues of constitutional law. 
In exercising this discretion, state courts can turn to a variety 
of methods to assist in their interpretive task. The most common 
methods used by state courts are appeals to common American val-
ues, textual, or character-based interpretive approaches. In the con-
text of separation of powers jurisprudence, none of these interpretive 
approaches is an adequate tool for addressing the problems state 
courts face. 
1. The "Common American Heritage" Approach 
There are serious limits to any interpretive approach that 
views state constitutionalism as a part of a "common American heri-
tage" with the federal system.273 This heritage is not always a shared 
271. For a discussion of the incorporation doctrine, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 772·77 {2d ed. 1988). 
272. See supra notes 92·95 and accompanying text (discussing the Guarantee Clause). 
273. On this view, see Gardner, supra note 4, at 1289 (suggesting that state courts are 
entitled to part company with the U.S. Supreme Court "for no other reason than, in the state 
court's view, the Supreme Court has gotten it wrong"); see also James A. Gardner, What Is a 
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one, particularly in the context of separation of powers, which was a 
highly contested doctrine at the time of the founding. 274 In their re-
sults, many state cases endorse Antifederalist ideals that contrast 
sharply with the Federalist ideals in the U.S. Constitution. Despite 
this, in rationale, many state cases invoke a common American heri-
tage interpretive method, duplicating the approach of U.S. Supreme 
Court separation of powers decisions, such as Chadha. 
For example, in Missouri Coalition for the Environment v. 
Joint Committee on Administrative Rules, the Missouri Supreme 
Court did nothing more than mimic the U.S. Supreme Court's Chadha 
opinion, applied in the context of Missouri's Constitution.275 While 
Chadha's formalism provides a fairly simple answer to the constitu-
tionality of committee suspension of agency rules, it skirts the distinct 
institutional practice of state legislative oversight. 
This lockstep approach is particularly misleading where non-
delegation issues are addressed. For example, the Hawaii Supreme 
Court, in upholding the constitutionality of a statute granting the 
state Public Service Commission the authority to grant interim rate 
increases, stated: 'The 'just and reasonable' standard has been upheld 
as constitutionally permissible, even though no specific formula for 
determining that which is just and reasonable has been statutorily 
set."276 The court relied on federal authority for its conclusion and did 
not independently assess the constitutionality of the statute under 
Hawaii's Constitution or case law. 
Other Hawaii cases also endorse a lockstep approach. In State 
v. Bernades, the Hawaii Supreme Court addressed whether state 
sentencing guidelines violate separation of powers under Hawaii's 
Constitution. 277 The Court ruled that the guidelines did not violate 
"the separation of powers doctrine under the Hawaii and United 
States Constitutions," a direct-but mysterious-reference to federal 
State Constitution?, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1025, 1044-54 (1993) (arguing that state constitutions are 
not the embodiment of independent political values, but instead are safeguards that reinforce 
national political values where the federal government has failed to do so); Kahn, supra note 6, 
at 1166 (noting state courts need not rely on "unique state sources" to support interpretations, 
but should attempt "to realize for their own communities the ideals that are the common 
heritage of the nation'). 
274. See William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of the Separation of Powers in the Age of the 
Framers, 30 WM. & MARYL. REV. 263, 265-66 (1989). 
275. Missouri Coalition for the Env't. v. Joint Comm. on Admin. Rules, 948 S.W.2d 125 
(Mo. 1997) (en bane). The reasoning of the opinion is discussed supra notes 194-210 and accom-
panying text. 
276. In re Kauai Elec. Div., 590 P.2d 524, 535 (Haw. 1978). 
277. State v. Bernades, 795 P.2d 842 (Haw. 1990). 
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law in a case where state law controls.278 No effort was made by the 
court to address possible differences in these independent sources of 
separation of powers. Such a lockstep approach ignores the evidence, 
historical and contemporary, that would suggest state constitutions 
endorse fundamentally different principles of separation of powers 
than the U.S. Constitution.279 
2. The Textual Approach 
Another, far more popular, method for resolving issues of 
interpretive discretion in state constitutional jurisprudence is to look 
to the constitutional text.280 This is precisely what the Florida Su-
preme Court did in Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, a modern Florida 
case addressing Florida's nondelegation doctrine. 281 There, the court 
reasoned that the text of Florida's strict separation of powers clause 
dictated Florida's rigorous approach to nondelegation. Florida's Su-
preme Court was correct to observe that the U.S. Constitution differs 
in text from Florida's Constitution. But its analysis should not have 
ended there: Florida's separation clause differs little in text from 
many states that have adopted a moderate or weak approach to the 
nondelegation issue. Constitutional text provides little assistance in 
explaining the various approaches to separation of powers issues 
vertically, between the U.S. and the states, or horizontally, among the 
many states. Thus, though perhaps tempting to state court judges, 
textualism fails as an interpretive method in the separation of powers 
context because it does not explain differences in result between sys-
tems with similar separation of powers clauses in their constitutions. 
278. Id. at 845. Hawaii is not the only state to endorse the lockstep approach. See In re 
Adoption of Regulations Governing the State Health Plan, 621 A.2d 484, 488 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1993) (relying almost exclusively on federal case law to uphold a delegation to a state 
agency). 
279. Daniel Elazar is perhaps the most consistent advocate of the theory that state consti· 
tutions are unique in their approach to separation of powers. See ELAZAR, supra note 21, at 109· 
15 (arguing that state constitutions endorse Whig notions of rigid separation of powers and 
legislative supremacy, whereas the U.S. Constitution is grounded in a notion of mixed powers). 
See also LUTZ, supra note 21, at 69 (noting distinction between federal and state constitutions, 
but suggesting that the distinction should not be pushed too far). 
280. See, e.g., Hans A. Linde, Are State Constitutions Common Law?, 34 Aruz. L. REV. 215, 
220-21 (1992) (criticizing the New Jersey Supreme Court's use of due process and equal protec· 
tion principles despite the absence of such provisions in the text of the New Jersey Constitu· 
ti on). 
281. Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1978). The case is further 
discussed supra notes 135·39 and accompanying text. 
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3. The ''Political Culture" Approach 
The new judicial federalism provides another, perhaps more 
attractive interpretive method. According to the advocates of this 
theory, the "political culture" of a region or locality should inform 
state constitutional interpretation. For example, as the political 
scientist Daniel Elazar has suggested, regional differences have had 
an impact on the development of state constitutions.282 As Elazar's 
empirical research suggests, states are diverse with respect to 
whether their political culture is primarily individualistic, moralistic, 
or traditionalistic. 283 
The objections to such an interpretive practice are many. 284 To 
begin, the extent to which this practice invites judges to invoke their 
own understanding of conventional morality for their locality or re-
gion places a judge in the difficult position of reading the state's cul-
tural pulse while also providing little hope for common experimenta-
tion between states. 
Even though there may be cognizable regional or statewide 
differences in public attitudes regarding the division of power be-
tween the legislature and executive, it does not follow that state judi-
cial opinions should explicitly reflect these differences in interpretive 
practices. At its extreme, this would require courts to identify cul-
tural values, inviting judges to take into account citizen attitudes 
about governmental institutions, such as the confidence polls for a 
given governor. Over time, this might lead to large swings in a state's 
separation of power jurisprudence, based on political attitudes and 
the political composition of courts.285 Thus, to the extent state courts 
do embrace this interpretive method in the separation of powers 
282. See ELAZAR, supra note 21, at 114. For academic lawyers and jurists endorsing this 
position, see supra note 3. 
283. See DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES 114·26 (2d 
ed. 1972). Following Robert Putnam's well known examination of civic culture and democracy 
in Italy, more recent empirical work attempts to construct indices for measuring civicness and 
governmental performance, reporting a wide divergence among the states. See Tom W. Rice & 
Alexander F. Sumberg, Civic Culture and Government Performance in the American States, 
PUBLIUS, Winter 1997, at 99. 
284. See, e.g., Daniel Gordon, Superconstitutions Saving the Shunned: The State Constitu-
tions Masquerading as Weaklings, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 965, 970 (1994) (urging deemphasis of role 
of state constitntions as repositories of fundamental values); Hans E. Linde, E Pluribus-
Constitutional Theory and State Courts, in DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 273, 
294·95 (Bradley D. McGraw ed., 1985); Hans A. Linde, State Constitutions Are Not Common 
Law: Comments on Gardner's Failed Discourse, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 927, 932 (1993). 
285. One recent commentator, challenges the community conception of state identity as 
giving "rise to pointless, indeed often silly, debates about state character." Robert A. Schapiro, 
Identity and Interpretation in State Constitutional Law, 84 VA. L. REV. 389, 393 (1998). 
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context, it is unlikely that any serious theory of state separation of 
powers will develop. Each state will simply have taken its own path 
in understanding its separation of powers jurisprudence, paying little 
or no attention to developments, similarities, and differences else-
where. For this reason, the political cultural method of interpreta-
tion, if used at all, might best be confined to instances where a state 
court is defining rights, not governmental structure.286 
This leads to a final objection to the political culture approach 
to state constitutional interpretation. At its worse, it results in a type 
of cultural relativism, suggesting courts identify sources of and 
merely describe culture rather than provide reasons to support their 
decisions. Even if the worst does materialize in result-allowing unac-
countable and extreme interpretation of issues involving human 
rights-the political culture interpretive method does not require state 
courts to juE?tify their constitutional decisions in a manner. that ap-
peals to courts outside of a given jurisdiction. In this sense, it thwarts 
the new judicial federalism ideal of experimental democracy,287 and 
thus collapses on its own weight. 
B. Institutional Design, the Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of 
Powers Ideals, and State Constitutional Interpretation 
The divergence between the federal approach and that of many 
states may be explained by reference to institutional design differ-
ences between the systems of governance. There are many institu-
tion,al similarities between federal and state systems of governance. 
At the same time, the institutional design features of many states 
hold promise to explain differences in jurisprudential approaches to 
separation of powers. While it would be a mistake to exaggerate the 
influence of these institutional design features on constitutional doc-
trine, they can go far towards explaining doctrinal nuances and en-
forcement levels in state separation of powers. 
286. Cf. Robert A. Schapiro, Contingency and Uniuersalism in State Separation of Powers 
Discourse, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 79, 95 (1998) ("States may have developed individual 
cultures giving rise to enhanced appreciation for free expression or privacy, but the basic 
mechanisms of governmental power have not changed since the framers erected the federal 
constitutional system.'). 
287. "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State 
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments 
without risk to the rest of the country.'' New State Ice Co. v. Liebemann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); cf. Rodriguez, supra note 9 (holding out hope for a "trans-state" 
constitutionalism). 
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1. Institutional Design and Nondelegation Doctrine 
Institutional analysis provides some explanation for the differ-
ence between federal and state nondelegation doctrine and enforce-
ment levels. Since the time of the Founding, commentators have 
observed that the state legislative process is more prone to faction 
than the federal lawmaking process. During the Founding, it is re-
ported, "[s]tate experience ... contributed, nothing more strongly, to 
discredit the whole idea of the sovereign legislature, [than] to bring 
home the real meaning of limited government and coordinate pow-
ers."288 The Federalists, responding to the notions of legislative su-
premacy in Whig and Antifederalist political science, endorsed a 
blended notion of separation of powers that provides for limits on 
legislative authority but, as has been suggested,289 Federalist political 
science is consistent with a relaxed nondelegation doctrine. 
In many states, Antifederalist principles are alive and well and 
the strong nondelegation doctrine, as it has been fashioned by state 
courts, acts as one limitation on the exercise of faction to capture 
lawmaking power. In strong nondelegation states, courts evaluate 
whether state legislatures have specific substantive standards to 
guide agency discretion in exercising delegated power. These stan-
dards limit agency discretion and also provide a meaningful measure 
for courts to apply in exercising judicial review. Moderate nondelega-
tion states require, at a minimum, some legislative statement of pol-
icy, and some require a statement of policy along with procedural 
safeguards. Without such standards, as compared to federal agencies, 
state agencies are more prone to capture by powerful and well-
organized interest groups, given the lower barriers to mobilization at 
the state level. 290 
Key institutional differences between the federal and most 
state legislative systems suggest that the problem of faction is much 
stronger at the state level. One difference is that state legislatures 
are in session for shorter periods than the U.S. Congress, and thus 
state legislative assemblies are likely to have less familiarity with 
issues and less time to evaluate bills than members of Congress. For 
example, the Texas Legislature sits for 120-day sessions once every 
288. THACH, supra note 26, at 52. 
289. See supra Part II.A. 
290. State legislatures, however, may also be more prone to faction than the U.S. Congress, 
as is discussed below. The Antifederalist principles of separation of powers seem to ignore 
legislative faction. 
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two years. 291 Florida has a sixty day session, only about forty five of 
which are working days; New Mexico's sessions are only sixty calen-
dar days in odd-numbered years, while in even-numbered years ses-
sions are limited thirty days and the focus is mainly on fiscal mat-
ters. 292 Many other state legislatures have similarly short sessions. 293 
A short legislative session might make delegation to an executive 
branch more practical, but most state courts have not endorsed dele-
gation for this efficiency purpose. Instead, state courts adhering to a 
strong nondelegation doctrine trade off the potential efficiencies asso-
ciated with delegation to guard against faction and ensure that the 
legislature, rather than agencies, makes key policy decisions. 
Other institutional design features also illustrate how faction 
is more likely to exacerbate state agency decisionmaking and why a 
nondelegation doctrine in the states may be more effective at mini-
mizing the effects of faction. Although in many states legislative staff 
is extensive, most states provide members of the legislature little staff 
assistance in exercising their lawmaking function. 294 Also, because of 
geographic proximity and economic and cultural similarities, the 
organization and mobilization of interest groups, such as farming or 
tobacco interest groups, is much easier at the state than the national 
level. Given lower costs of organization and mobilization, such inter-
est groups are more likely at the state than federal level to influence 
the political process.295 Aware of this phenomenon at the time of the 
Founding, Madison wrote that "[t]he influence of factious leaders may 
kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to 
291. See TEX. CONST. art. III, § 5; see also Bruff, supra note 16, at 1346 (discussing poten-
tial impact of this institutional feature on Texas nondelegation doctrine). 
292. See ALAN ROSENTHAL, THE DECLINE OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY: PROCESS, 
PARTICIPATION, AND POWER IN STATE LEGISLATURES 128 (1998). 
293. See THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 64-67 (1998-99 
ed.); see also Alan Rosenthal, The State of State Legislatures: An Oueruiew, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
1185, 1187-1192 (1983). 
294. See ALAN ROSENTHAL, LEGISLATIVE PERFORMANCE IN THE STATES: EXPLORATIONS OF 
COMMITTEE BEHAVIOR 149-51 (1974). 
295. For over thirty years, economists and political scientists have recognized and explored 
the role of interest groups in influencing the political process and its outcomes. See, e.g., 
GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE: ESSAYS ON REGULATION (1975); George J. 
Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971). The 
insights of economists, such as Stigler, have been applied by modern political scientists writing 
in the field of public choice. See generally MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, & GOVERNANCE, supra note 
47; Jim Rossi, Public Choice Theory and the Fragmented Web of the Contemporary Administra-
tive State, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1746 (1998) (book review). 
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spread a general conflagration through the. other States."296 Madison 
derided the tendency of state legislators to sacrifice the interests of 
their state for the particular and separate views of their counties and 
localities. 297 Faction makes capture of the state legislative process-
and particularly delegation to an agency controlled by a small but pow-
erful constituency-more likely.298 Consistent with the ideals of Whig 
and Antifederalist constitutionalism, modern state legislatures un-
dergo a high degree of turnover vis-a-vis the U.S. Congress,299 con-
tributing to the likelihood that the state legislative process will pro-
duce laws that are the product of highly-organized special interest 
groups representing a small but vocal group of the legislature's con-
stituency. 
Of course commentators have argued that, at the federal level, 
delegation of decisionmaking authority to agency decisionmakers can 
have pro-democratic effects, in part because the unitary executive 
provides some degree of streamlined accountability to the President's 
Office for agency policy decisions. 300 Even though the President is not 
aware of most agency decisions-especially minor ones-the President 
is often held accountable by the media, Congress, and the public at 
large for the positions of agencies within the executive branch. Many 
suggest that the U.S. Constitution envisions a "unitary executive."301 
Although a few states follow this approach, 302 most states do not have 
a unitary executive. 303 In Texas, for instance, the long ballot provides 
296. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison). See also WOOD, supra note 13, at 550-51 
(noting purpose of separation of powers for Federalists was to avoid legislative usurpation and 
oppression). 
297. See JOSEPH M. BESSETTE, THE MILD VOICE OF REASON 26 (1994). 
298. See Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Delibera-
tive Agency Decisionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 173, 184-85 (1997). 
299. See ROSENTHAL, supra note 292, at 67-80 (describing the influence of term limits and 
other factors on the degree of professionalism in state legislatures). 
300. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. 
301. See Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary 
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1155 (1992). See generally Saikrishna 
Bangalore Prakash, Note, Hail to the Chief Administrator: The Framer's and the President's 
Administrative Powers, 102 YALE L.J. 991 (1993). 
302. The Pennsylvania and Virginia executives are almost entirely unitary, providing for 
general election of the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and Attorney General and few other 
officers. See PA. CONST. art. N, §§ 1, 4.1, 5, 18 (providing for the election of the Governor, 
Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, Auditor General, and State Treasurer); VA. CONST. 
art. V, §§ 2, 13, 15 (providing for election of the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and Attorney 
General). Some of the more recent state constitutions also provide for a unitary executive; see 
also ALASKA CONST. art. III, §§ 3, 8 (only elected officials are Governor and Lieutenant Gover-
nor, who run together on a single ticket); HAW. CONST. art. V, § 6 (providing heads of all princi-
pal departments will be nominated by the Governor and confirmed by the Senate); IOWA CONST. 
art. N, §§ 1-4, 22 (similar to Alaska, but also providing for election of Secretary 'or State, 
Auditor, and Treasurer); MD. CONST. art. ll, §§ 10, 18, 22 (similar to Hawaii); N.J. CONST. art. 
V, § 4, 11 3, 4 (similar to Hawaii). 
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for the separate election of officials such as the lieutenant governor, 
the attorney general, the comptroller, the treasurer, and the land 
commissioner.304 Florida also has a plural executive branch, providing 
for separate and independent election of a Governor and an Attorney 
General, a Commissioner of Agriculture, a Commissioner of Educa-
tion, a Comptroller, an Insurance Commissioner and Treasurer, and a 
Secretary of State.305 Alabama provides for separate statewide elec-
tion of a Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, State 
Auditor, Secretary of State, State Treasurer, Superintendent of Edu-
cation, and Commissioner of Agriculture and Industries. 306 Most 
other states have similar provisions providing for independent elec-
tion of statewide executives, although the listing of executives varies 
from state to state, 307 and a handful of states with older constitutions 
provide for election of some executive officers by the legislature.308 
Among states that deviate from the unitary executive model in their 
constitutions, the governor's power to lead and supervise bureaucracy 
303. All but four states provide for independent election of lower (or co-equal) executive 
branch officials, and many provide for popular election to executive offices. See THE COUNCIL OF 
STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 293, at 35-40. The plural executive branch is largely a result 
of turn-of-the century progressive constitutional reform. See Roger Kersh et. al., "More of a 
Distinction of Words than Things'~ The Evolution of Separated Powers in the American States, 4 
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 5, 29-35 (1998). 
304. See TEX CONST. art. IV, §§ 1, 2 (providing for statewide election of Attorney General, 
Comptroller of Public Accounts, and Commissioner of General Land Office along with Governor 
and Lieutenant Governor; Secretary of State is appointed by Governor); see also Bruff, supra 
note 16, at 1347. 
305. See FLA. CONST. art. IV, §§ 4, 5; see also Richard K. Scher, The Governor & Cabinet: 
Executive Policymaking and Policy Management in THE F'LoRIDA PUBLIC POLICY MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEM: GROWTH AND REFORM IN AMERICA'S FOURTH LARGEST STATE 73 (Richard Chackerian, 
ed., 2d ed. 1998). 
306. See ALA. CONST. art. V, §§ 112, 114-16. 
307. See ARIZ. CONST. art. V, § 1; ARK. CONST. art. VI, §§ 1, 3; CAL. CONST. art. V, § 11; 
COLO. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1, 3; CONN. CONST. art. 4, §§ 1, 3, 4; DEL. CONST. art. 3, § 10, art. 4, §§ 
19, 21; GA. CONsT. art. V, § ill, , 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IV, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. V, § 1; IND. 
CONST. art. 6, § 1; KAN. CONST. art. I, § 1; KY. CONST. § 91; LA. CONST. art. IV, § 3; MICH. 
CONST. art. V, § 21; MINN. CONST. art. V, § 1; MISS. CONST. art. 5, §§ 133, 134; Mo. CONST. art. 
IV, § 17; NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. 5, § 19; N.M. CONST. art. V, § 1; N.Y. CONST. 
art. V, § 1; N.D. CONST. art. V, § 2; OHIO CONST. art. III, § 1; OKLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4; OR. 
CONST. art. VI, § 1; R.I. CONST. art. IV, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. VI, § 7; S.D. CONST. art. IV, § 7; 
UTAH CONST. art. VII,§ 1; VT. CONST. ch. II,§§ 43, 47-49; WASH. CONST. art. III,§§ 1, 3; W. VA. 
CONST. art. VII, § 1; WIS. CONST. art. VI, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. IV, § 11. 
308. See ME. CONST. art. V, pt. 2, § 1, pt. 3, § 1 (legislative election of Secretary of State 
and Treasurer); MASS. CONST. pt. 2, Ch. 2, § IV, art. I, § 80 (legislative election of Secretary, 
Treasurer and Receiver General, Commissary General, Notaries Public, and Naval Officers); 
N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 67 (legislative election of Secretary of State and Treasurer); TENN. 
CONST. art. VII, § 3 (legislative election of Treasurer or Treasurers, and Comptroller of the 
Treasury). 
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is reduced, 309 although political scientists observe great variations in 
the degree of reduced leadership and supervision. 310 Regardless of the 
variations of degree across the various states, in most states the abil-
ity of a governor to oversee executive policymaking is weak relative to 
the U.S. President's. From an accountability perspective, this makes 
delegation more suspicious in the states than at the federal level. 
Finally, regardless of procedural safeguards that may exist 
under state AP As-safeguards that might suffice for purposes of 
meeting Davis' nondelegation test-many states do not have the same 
degree of rigorous judicial review of agency rulemaking that is avail-
able under the federal AP A In Texas, the degree of judicial review of 
agency action varies significantly; sometimes, review is unavailable. 311 
In Florida, for example, arbitrary and capricious review of an agency's 
reasoning process, as is available under the federal AP A, is not gener-
ally available in the course of judicial review.312 Bill Funk, in his 1991 
survey of state rationality review, reports that only eight states follow 
the federal example of providing a statutory basis for judicial review 
of the rationality of rules. 313 To the extent states lack rigorous judicial 
review, particularly of agency rulemaking, this exacerbates the over-
sight problem. As Harold Bruff has stated, "[a]bsent effective judicial 
review, an agency may be accountable to no one but itself."314 
Because of institutional design differences between the federal 
system and that of many states and the way these differences influ-
ence the possibility of capture, state courts have reasons for endorsing 
a stronger version of the nondelegation doctrine than their federal 
counterparts. State legislatures, and often agencies, are more prone 
309. An example is Florida. Richard Scher observes that, although Florida's Governor is 
historically weak in power relative to other state governors, reforms to budgetary power have 
strengthened the power of Florida's governor since 1968. See Scher, supra note 305, at 79. 
310. See Thad L. Beyle, Governors, in POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN STATES 201 (Virginia 
Gray et al. eds., 5th ed. 1990); Joseph Schlesinger, The Politics of the Executive, in POLITICS IN 
THE AMERICAN STATES 210 (Herbert Jacob & Kenneth N. Vines eds., 2d ed. 1971); Julia E. 
Ronbinson, The Role of the Independent Political Executive in State Governance: Stability in the 
Face of Change, 58 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 119 (1998). 
311. See Firemen's & Policemen's Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Blanchard, 582 S.W.2d 778, 779 
(Tex. 1979). 
312. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.68(9) (West 1996). For recent modifications to burdens of 
proof and standards of review in rule validity challenges under Florida's APA, see Jim Rossi, 
The 1996 Revised Florida Administrative Procedure Act: A Rulemaking Revolution or Counter-
Revolution?, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 345 (1997). 
313. See William Funk, Rationality Review of State Administrative Rulemaking, 43 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 147, 154 (1991). For an argument against arbitrary and capricious review of rulemak-
ing under state APAs, see Dave Frohnmeyer, National Trends in Court Review of Agency Action: 
Some Reflections on the Model State Administrative Procedure Act and the New Utah Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, 3 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 1 (1989). 
314. Bruff, supra note 16, at 1347. 
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to faction than the U.S. Congress or federal agencies, both because 
the costs of organizing and mobilizing local factions are lower and 
because state legislatures, in session for very limited terms, are not as 
effective as Congress at oversight. In addition, agencies are less 
accountable to an executive leader and judicial review of agency deci-
sionmaking is much less rigorous than at the federal level. 
Although there are some institutional reasons for enforcing the 
strong or moderate nondelegation doctrine at the state level-and 
these may have contributed to the continued adherence to Antifeder-
alist principles-it would seem that state judges are inclined to the 
same institutional failures as their federal counterparts in imple-
menting the nondelegation doctrine. As commentators have observed, 
one of the problems with the nondelegation doctrine is that courts are 
not capable of articulating a coherent and consistent nondelegation 
doctrine. 315 Although many of these commentators view courts as 
possessing inherently political traits, a proposition that is debatable, 
this critique of the nondelegation doctrine has much support in the 
literature. 316 
State judges, though, may have different comparative institu-
tional advantages within state systems of governance than their 
federal counterparts. Over forty states provide for popular election of 
state judges, a design feature that enhances the political accountabil-
ity of state judges while decreasing their independence, as compared 
to their federal counterparts. 317 In addition, many state courts have 
the constitutional authority to evaluate legislation more frequently 
than federal courts; thus, state courts may have more experience 
addressing the validity of legislative delegations than their federal 
counterparts. Ellen A. Peters, a Senior Justice of the Supreme Court 
of Connecticut, observed state separation of powers jurisprudence in 
Mimiesota and Connecticut and reported "[f]ederal courts apparently 
315. See Carl McGowan, Congress, Court, and Control of Delegated Power, 77 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1119, 1128-30 (1977); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Accountability and Delegated Power: 
A Response to Professor Lowi, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 391, 402-07 (1987); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The 
Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 
1244-47 (1989). 
316. See, e.g., Mashaw, Prodelegation, supra note 47; Richard Stewart, Beyond Delegation 
Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 323 (1987); see also BARBER, supra note 91, at 76 (describing 
nondelegation doctrine as "heavily encrusted with the constructs of judicial myth-making" and 
revealing a ·~udicial propensity to manipulate well-rehearsed formulas for upholding delega-
tions of any kind"); LoUIS JOLFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 51, 56 (1965) 
(finding courts' reasoning in the nondelegation context as "hopelessly fictional rationalization" 
and "sheer illusion"). 
317. See THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 293, at 135-37. 
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have much more limited opportunities to participate in institutional 
interventions that emphasize collegial exchanges rather than separa-
tion of powers."318 Although many state constitutions, like the U.S. 
Constitution, prohibit courts from exercising jurisdiction until an 
actual case or controversy is presented, some state constitutions give 
courts constitutional authority to issue advisory opinions.319 As Jus-
tice Peters describes, courts in states, including Minnesota and Con-
necticut, are regularly provided with advance notice of pending legis-
lation and are allowed the opportunity to "influence the language, 
content, and effect of pending legislation to minimize the risk of fu-
ture points of conflict."320 Whether this role of state courts makes it 
easier for them than their federal counterparts to implement a non-
delegation doctrine is questionable, but the institutional difference in 
roles may make state judges more comfortable in exercising this role. 
2. Institutional Design and the Need for More Continuing 
Legislative Control, Not Just Oversight 
Institutional differences in the operations of the federal and 
many state systems of governance also support some degree of diver-
gence in the jurisprudential approaches to legislative control of the 
agency rulemaking process between federal and state courts. These 
include some basic principles of state constitutional law, as well as 
both legislative and executive features of state governments. 
To begin, as a matter of constitutional law, legislative power in 
the states is fundamentally different than in the federal system. The 
318. See Ellen A. Peters, Getting Away from the Federal Paradigm: Separation. of Powers in 
State Courts, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1543, 1561 (1997). 
319. See, e.g., MAss. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 3, art. II (discussing ability of each branch of the 
legislature and the governor or the council te require the opinion of the supreme judicial court); 
N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 74 (noting authority by each branch of the legislature and the governor 
or the council to require the opinion of the justices of the Supreme Court on questions of law 
and solemn occasions); R.I. CONST. art. 10, § 3 (noting that the justices of the Supreme Court 
will issue an advisory opinion on any question of law whenever requested by the governor or 
either house of the legislature); see also COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (allowing Governor, Senate or 
House of Representatives te ask Supreme Court for an opinion); FLA. CONST., art. 4, § 10 
(allowing the Supreme Court to issue advisory opinions when requested by Attorney General); 
ME. CONST. art. 6, § 3 (providing Governor, Senate, and House the power to require opinions); 
MICH. CONST. art. 3, § 8 (allowing Governor and either House of legislature to require opinions); 
S.D. CONST. art. 5, § 5 (providing the Governor the power to require opinions of Supreme Court); 
ALA. CODE§ 12-2-10 (allowing Governor or either house of the Legislature to request an advi-
sory opinion); 29 Del. Laws 2102 (allowing the Governor or a majority of the General Assembly 
to ask for an opinion). 
320. Peters, supra note 318, at 1561. In Connecticut, some consultation between courts 
and the legislature is required by statute. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-15a (West 1985) 
(requiring annual consultation between the superior court rules committee and the legislative 
judiciary committee). 
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U.S. Constitution explicitly grants Congress certain powers to pursue 
broad ends and, under the necessary and proper clause, these powers 
also carry the subsidiary powers necessary for the achievement of 
these ends. 321 Modern state legislatures, much like the enormously 
powerful Whig legislatures, are not limited to a listing of enumerated 
powers, but exercise plenary power. For instance, the Kansas Su-
preme Court recently stated: ''It is fundamental that our state consti-
tution limits rather than confers powers. Where the constitutionality 
of a statute is involved, the question presented is, therefore, not 
whether the act is authorized by the constitution, but whether it is 
prohibited thereby."322 Thus, many state legislatures have general 
constitutional authorization for exercising much broader authority 
than the U.S. Congress.323 It should come as no surprise that state 
legislatures, consistent with their Whig predecessors and Antifeder-
alist principles, see themselves as wielding almost complete sover-
eignty, absent the exercise of any powers specifically forbidden. 
Institutional design features of state governments also provide 
some explanation of doctrinal divergences and divergences in en-
forcement levels on issues such as the legislative veto between federal 
and state systems. The nature of state legislatures suggests a need 
for more formal oversight of agency governance than exists at the 
federal level. Since, as is discussed above, 324 most state legislatures 
only meet a couple of months a year, the time they are in session is 
scarce. As bodies of the whole or in their jurisdictional committees, 
state legislatures are not capable of engaging in regular oversight of 
agency activities as effectively as the U.S. Congress. When Congress 
wishes to evaluate a controversial agency proposal, it holds committee 
321. Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) ("Let the end be 
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, 
which are plainly adopted to that end, which are not pro!µbited, but consist with the letter and 
spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."). 
322. State ex rel. Tomasic v. Unified Gov't of Wyandotte County, 955 P.2d 1136, 1145 (Kan. 
1998); see also Pratt v. Allen, 13 Conn. 119, 124-25 (1839) (distinguishing between limited 
powers conferred to the federal government and the extreme powers of state government); 
Client Follow-Up Co. v. Hynes, 390 N.E.2d 847, 849 (Ill. 1979) (explaining that since "the basic 
sovereign power of the State resides in the legislature ... there is no need to grant power to the 
legislature"). 
323. "State governments are not restricted in the purposes for which they can exercise 
power-they can legislate comprehensively to protect the public welfare-and because of this, 
state constitutional interpretation cannot proceed in terms of a state government's 'important 
objects' and 'minor ingredients' .... " G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 7-8 
(1998). A classic statement of this proposition is W. F. Dodd, The Function of a State Constitu-
tion, 30 POL. Ser. Q. 201, 205 (1915). 
324. See supra notes 291-93 and accompanying text. 
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hearings, as it did in reaction to EPA's proposed clean air regulations 
in 1997.325 In the course of these hearings, an agency can receive 
signals-positive and negative-regarding Congress's desires. An 
agency can also receive early warning of congressional reaction to the 
agency's decision, such as a possibility of budget cuts or new legisla-
tion, and can take this into account when it makes its decisions. 
Although the legislative oversight process does not always work per-
fectly, it provides a powerful tool to check the agency rulemaking 
process at the federal level. 
In the states, by contrast, agency-specific oversight hearings 
are rarely held. When the legislature is in session, it is more likely 
that the leadership will focus hearings on a handful of high-profile 
issues, maximizing its public profile during its short life. In addition, 
staffs of state legislatures, on the whole, are not as experienced and 
sophisticated as staff members in the U.S. Congress. Even if the 
legislature is able to hold agency-specific oversight hearings, the level 
of understanding of agency decisionmaking is likely to be much lower 
than at the federal level. A final factor likely to influence state doc-
trine and enforcement levels in the context of legislative review of 
rules is the reality of reduced executive power and supervision ability, 
which are not likely to be as effective as the U.S. President's.326 
Because of these problems with regnlar formal and informal 
oversight, many states institutionalize rules review in the legislature 
by establishing a special ''rules review" committee. 327 In many states, 
institutionalized legislative review is of much greater utility than at 
the federal level. Of course, to the extent the state legislative process 
is dominated by factionalized decisionmaking, this is not always a 
positive feature of state agency decisionmaking. But, for part time 
legislatures, it has become essential to the functioning of state gov-
ernments. For these institutional reasons, state legislatures hold on 
dearly to rules review mechanisms, such as the legislative veto. As a 
practical matter, a state legislature's rules review mechanism, even if 
unconstitutional, is unlikely to be challenged successfully because any 
325. The EPA's 1997 clean air rules established stringent new standards for ozone and for 
particulates. See John H. Cushman, Jr., Clinton Sharply Tightens Air Pollution Regulations 
Despite Concern Over Costs, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1997, at Al. The EPA and Clinton Admini-
stration proposed fairly stringent standards, but congressional hearings and input tempered the 
standards adopted by the agency. See Alexandra Marks, Losers in Smog Battle Try End-Run 
Attack, CHRISTIAN SCI. MmnTOR, Aug. 14, 1997, at 3. The EPA's regulations were reversed and 
remanded by the D.C. Circuit in American Trucking Association, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 
(D.C. Cir. 1999). See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text. 
326. For discussion, see supra notes 300-310 and accompanying text. 
327. See supra Part ID.C. 
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agency doing so is almost certain to be subject to retaliation. 328 So, at 
the state level, some underenforcement of restrictions such as those at 
issue in Chadha may be expected. Thus, due to institutional design, 
states continue to hold on to strong legislative control, such as com-
mittee veto, committee-triggered delays of rulemaking, and commit-
tee-triggered burden shifting, even where these are constitutionally 
suspect. 
3. Constitutional Interpretation and Institutional Design 
An explicit acknowledgement of aspirational principles for 
separation of powers and an awareness of institutional design are 
necessary to justify the Antifederalist legacy that continues in many 
states. Institutional design features informing separation of powers 
doctrine are something more than values that differ from state to 
state, or between the state and national systems of governance, as 
many of advocates of the new judicial federalism assert.329 Although 
differences in details abound, institutional design features of many 
state systems of governance, such as the structure of the executive 
branch, may have influenced separation of powers doctrines, includ-
ing state adherence to Antifederalist principles. Judicial recognition 
of institutional features would help to identify the aspirational polity 
represented in a state's constitution and the practical necessities of 
governance that sustain or thwart it. 330 
In addition, institutional design features should inform how 
state courts use precedents from the U.S. Supreme Court or from the 
high courts of other states. The examination of institutional features 
that influence state separation of powers jurisprudence suggests some 
lessons for state courts attempting usage of extra-jurisdictional 
authority in the separation of powers contexts. Given variations in 
text and institutional structure, rarely will an authority from another 
jurisdiction squarely resolve the interpretive question of state consti-
tutional law. To the extent institutional design factors contribute to 
the path of state separation of powers jurisprudence, an acknow-
ledgement of these factors can improve the reasoning of state court 
opinions addressing separation of powers issues. Attention to such 
328. Examples of state roles review processes that are suspect under Chadha are summa· 
rized supra notes 246-68 and accompanying text. 
329. On this position, see sources cited supra note 3. 
330. See Schapiro, supra note 285, at 455-56 (suggesting that state constitutions represent 
aspirational, rather than preexisting, values). 
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factors will make judicial opinions more accessible to and usable by 
courts in other states, and will bring attention to the relationship 
between institutional design and legal doctrine. 
Yet the infrequency with which state courts acknowledge 
institutional differences in using authority from other jurisdictions is 
astounding. In many state cases, separation of powers analysis be-
comes a counting game-a "mee-tooism" 331-where a court simply cites 
the number of state opinions accepting a certain type of statute and 
the number rejecting it, usually as support for siding with the major-
ity of states having previously considered the issue. In Colorado, for 
example, the Supreme Court, in upholding the constitutionality of the 
state's Agricultural Marketing Act, stated: 
We have read opinions from twenty.one states which have upheld marketing 
acts comparable to the one adopted in Colorado. In six states we have found 
decisions which have held such acts, in certain particulars, to be unconstitu· 
tional. The great weight of authority seems to uphold marketing acts which 
are framed in language similar to that found in the Colorado law.332 
The court made no effort to refer to the texts of these state's constitu-
tions, nor did it make any effort to address similarities and differ-
ences with Colorado's governmental structure. 
One of the more notable recent nondelegation cases, Texas Boll 
Weevil Eradication Foundation Inc. v. Lewellen, also failed to ade-
quately acknowledge how institutional design features and their 
tendency to influence faction in state agency decisionmaking support 
adherence to a strong nondelegation doctrine. The court noted that 
state courts ''have historically been more comfortable" striking laws 
on nondelegation grounds than their federal counterparts, but failed 
to provide any normative or institutional reason for this difference in 
constitutional doctrine. 333 
The approach of the court in striking down private delegations 
illustrates how attention to the relationship between institutional 
design and incentives affecting private behavior can inform state 
nondelegation doctrine. Often, in states such as Texas, even where 
delegation is made to a collegial public board, the structure of the 
board is such that it is effectively similar to a private governance 
331. John Frank, a prominent appellate lawyer, describes the general state of state consti· 
tutional law as inclined towards "a sort of pallid me-tooism." John P. Frank, Symposium: The 
Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1339, 1340 (1985) (book review). 
332. Swisher v. Brown, 402 P.2d 621, 628 (Colo. 1965) (en bane). 
333. Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 468 (Tex. 
1997). The case is discussed in more detail supra notes 122-29 and accompanying text. 
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board, such as the agency at issue in Boll Weevil. For example, many 
state licensing boards, such as those that set standards for doctors, 
engineers, or barbers, are comprised of several members of the profes-
sion regulated and an at-large member, intended to represent con-
sumer interests. These agencies, like a state legislature, may meet 
infrequently, have limited staff, and are comprised of amateurs rather 
than civil servants. The decisionmaking process of this type of board 
is more likely to be captured than delegation to a more directly ac-
countable executive branch agency. State judicial adherence to a 
strong nondelegation doctrine can therefore be explained as a judicial 
effort to limit faction and its contribution to capture in agency deci-
sionmaking. 334 Reference to institutional features of state constitu-
tions, such as the fragmented executive, 335 might provide some ration-
ale to support adherence to a strong nondelegation doctrine in states 
such as Texas, as these features will influence the degree of faction 
and likelihood of capture. 
This is not to suggest that state courts should-or will-always 
strike down delegation to a private or collegial board for regulatory 
purposes. Contrast Boll Weevil to Florida's approach in assessing 
delegation to a private board. In State Department of Citrus v. Grif-
fin, the Florida Supreme Court upheld a legislative delegation to the 
Citrus Commission, composed of members of the orange industry, to 
issue marketing orders. 336 The marketing orders were intended to 
assist the industry in stabilizing supply and demand in response to 
market shocks brought on by natural catastrophes or overabundant 
supply. 337 Although Florida, like Texas, is a strong nondelegation 
state, the Florida Supreme Court upheld the delegation, observing 
''judicial scrutiny ought to be accompanied by recognition and appre-
334. The Texas Supreme Court explained: "[W]e believe it axiomatic that courts should 
subject private delegations to a more searching scrutiny than their public counterparts." Id. at 
469. Other states courts have also struck down private delegations. See, e.g., Hillman v. 
Northern Wasco County People's Util. Dist., 323 P.2d 664, 674 (Or. 1958) (invalidating a statute 
that adopted an electrical code of a private organization of electricians, who had authority to 
amend the code in the future, and made violations of the code unlawful). Many states have 
invalidated statutes that delegate to private accrediting agencies the power to determine 
members of a profession, such as medicine or pharmacy. See, e.g., Garces v. Department of 
Registration and Educ., 254 N.E.2d 622 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969); Gumbhir v. Kansas State Bd. of 
Pharmacy, 618 P.2d 837 (Kan. 1980). 
335. See supra note 304 (referring to Texas' long ballot); see also Bruff, supra note 16, at 
1346-48 (noting influence ofreduced executive power on nondelegation). 
336. State Dep't of Citrus v. Griffin, 239 So. 2d 577, 580-81 (Fla. 1970). 
337. See id. at 578. 
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ciation of the need for flexibility."338 Protecting against market shocks 
is the type of regulatory action for which short-term flexibility is more 
valuable than defining geographic pest eradication zones, as in Texas' 
recent Boll Weevil case.339 Thus, although the goals of accountability 
and protection against faction may influence some states to endorse a 
strong nondelegation doctrine, especially in the private delegation 
context, state courts also appear to balance the need for flexibility in 
achieving a regulatory program's purposes against these goals. 
State courts' concerns with faction and capture relate closely to 
issues of institutional design. This relationship becomes more appar-
ent when examined in the context of a continuing puzzle of state 
nondelegation jurisprudence, delegation to a federal agency. In many 
states that endorse a strong nondelegation doctrine, the legislature 
has delegated some aspects of regulation to federal agencies, often 
without any definition of standards or safeguards by the state legisla-
ture. For example, a challenged provision of the Texas Solid Waste 
Disposal Act criminalized the transportation, storage, processing, 
disposal, and export of ''hazardous waste," defined as "solid waste 
identified or listed as a hazardous waste by the administrator of the 
United State Environmental Protection Agency .... "340 A Texas ap-
pellate court noted that this delegation "may be read to say the legis-
lature has delegated to the EPA the power to define hazardous waste . 
. . and that the definition may change from time to time at the will of 
the EPA ... ,"but also observed that such a construction would ''place 
in doubt'' the constitutionality of the statute. 341 Thus, somewhat 
disingenuously, the court read the statute to incorporate by reference 
the EPA's definition of solid waste at the time of enactment of the 
Texas statute, but not modifications adopted by the EPA after-
wards. 342 
338. Id. at 581. 
339. Boll Weevil involved a delegation of power to set geographic zones and to finance and 
enforce pest eradication, without providing specific guidance for the definition of these zones. 
These zones, unlike market supply and demand conditions, would be unlikely to change signifi-
cantly from year to year, and thus there would seem to be less of a need for flexibility in imple-
menting Texas' pest eradication program than Florida's orange industry stabilization program. 
A later Florida case, Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So.2d 913 (Fla. 1979) (discussed supra 
notes 135-39 and accompanying text), invalidated a delegation of authority to define geographic 
areas of critical state concern for purposes of managing development, a regulatory context in 
which flexibility is not as important as in Griffin. 
340. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.§§ 361.22l(a)(l)-(2) (stating transport of hazardous 
waste to unauthorized locations is a criminal offense) (later repealed by acts 1997, 75th leg.ch. 
107; § 361.003(15) (West 1992). 
341. Exparte Elliott, 973 S.W.2d 737, 741 (Tex. App. 1998). 
342. See id. at 742-43. For a case that held the state legislature's delegation to a federal 
agency unconstitutional, see City of Oklahoma City v. Oklahoma Dep't of Labor, 918 P.2d 26, 28 
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The Texas court did not need to read the statute this way to 
uphold the delegation. In many states, the delegation doctrine is 
applied differently where the delegation is made to a federal, rather 
than state, decisionmaker. Courts have upheld state legislature 
delegations of authority to a federal agency, including future law-
making authority, even where the state nondelegation doctrine has 
not been met. For example, in McFaddin v. Jackson, the Tennessee 
Supreme Court upheld a statute that made individual retirement 
plans taxable if subject to the federal estate tax, but exempt if ex-
cluded from the federal estate tax. 343 Articulating concerns of uni-
formity and administrative simplicity in conforming tax statutes, the 
court reasoned that the delegation was constitutional despite the 
legislature's failure to provide adequate standards and safeguards.344 
Also, in Florida, the Supreme Court upheld a statute that made un-
lawful "unfair . . . acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or 
commerce" and instructed state regulators to adopt regulations con-
sistent with the Federal Trade Commission's. 345 
The conventional explanation for this difference in delegation 
outcome depending on the decisionmaker is that a state legislature's 
delegation to a federal agency may, in certain contexts, promote uni-
formity. 346 However, attention to institutional design provides an 
alternative explanation for this nondelegation puzzle. Regardless of a 
regulatory scheme's purposes, the institutional design features of 
federal agencies may also make the possibility of capture and fac-
tional interference in the agency lawmaking process less likely. In 
the states, reduced legislative oversight, due to limited sessions, and 
reduced executive oversight, due to plural offices in the executive 
branch, may make capture of an agency's decision making process 
more likely than at the federal level. In addition, many federal agen-
cies will be superior at making technical decisions that require regu-
lar revision than their state counterparts. Judicial decisions address-
ing delegation to federal agencies have failed to address institutional 
(Okla. 1995) (striking as unconstitutional a statute that stated that the prevailing hourly wage 
rate for Oklahoma would be determined by the United States Department of Labor). 
343. McFaddin v. Jackson, 738 S.W.2d 176, 176-77 (Tenn. 1987). 
344. See id. at 182. 
345. Department of Legal Affairs v. Rogers, 329 So. 2d 257, 262·63 (Fla. 1976). 
346. One commentator argues that courts addressing the constitutionality of such delega· 
tions should address the importance of uniformity in the area regulated. See Arnold Rochvarg, 
State Adoption of Federal Law-Legislative Abdication or Reasoned Policymaking, 36 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 277, 298 (1984). 
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design factors that might make the delegation more acceptable de-
pending on who the agency decisionmaker is. 
State court examination of separation of powers as a constraint 
on legislative oversight is no better in its acknowledgement of institu-
tional design factors. In recent cases addressing this issue, state 
co~ts use federal authority coupled with reference to the number of 
states concurring with little or no explanation of institutional simi-
larities beyond simple reference to presentment, bicameralism, and 
veto requirements in the state constitution's text.347 An acknow-
ledgement of institutional design factors might focus on the ideals of 
legislative supremacy that drive states' continued adherence to formal 
committee review, underenforcement of Chadha norms, and suspect 
mechanisms such as temporary committee suspension. 
More insightfully, an appreciation of institutional design will 
help to explain the continuing survival in many states of formal leg-
islative oversight mechanisms that appear to violate Chadha. The 
constitutionality of legislative review provisions in many states may 
not have been fully litigated because of strong incentives against 
challenge at the state level. State agencies may be reluctant to chal-
lenge legislative review mechanisms, in large part because they fear 
retaliation by the legislature. Where these review mechanisms have 
been challenged, state agencies, fearing legislative retaliation, may 
face strong incentives to settle or compromise. 
This also seems to be the case at the federal level where hun-
dreds of legislative vetoes have been adopted into law since 
Chadha,348 but enforcement of Chadha separation of powers principle 
is even weaker in many states. First, unlike post-Chadha legislative 
review mechanisms at the federal level, which are often not explicit 
and visible, in many states' legislative vetoes, waiting periods, and 
shifting burdens are explicitly endorsed in statutes. Second, in many 
states these review mechanisms are general in nature, applying to all 
agency rules, and are not limited to subject-specific legislation as they 
are at the federal level. Because of these factors, the bargaining 
power of any individual agency wishing to contest legislative control 
politically is much weaker than at the federal level. At the same 
time, the fear of retaliation by the legislature might discourage legal 
challenge of the legislative review process, as in North Carolina.349 
Thus, more general and sweeping legislative review mechanisms, 
347. See supra notes 194-227 and accompanying text (discussing Missouri and Michigan 
cases). 
348. See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text. 
349. For examples, see supra notes 257-68 and accompanying text. 
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which are suspect under Chadha, survive in many states than at the. 
federal level. So, for institutional design reasons, separation of pow-
ers restrictions on legislative oversight may be "underenforced" con-
stitutional norms in many states. aso 
This strand of separation of powers teaches a lesson to separa-
tion of powers students: in assessing constitutional divergences be-
tween the federal and state systems on issues such as constitutional 
limitations on legislative oversight, courts and scholars should not 
only pay attention to doctrine but also to differences in enforcement 
levels, an issue that requires a fuller appreciation of the micro-politics 
of state bureaucratic decisionmaking. 
In each of these contexts-nondelegation and the legislative 
oversight-acknowledgement of a theory of separation of powers and 
discussion of institutional design features that might have influenced 
this theory could work to strengthen our understanding of courts, 
agencies, and the legislature in developing and enforcing separation of 
powers principles. Discussion of these features is a necessary predi-
cate to understanding the Antif ederalist legacy, constructing an inde-
pendent state theory of separation of powers, and identifying institu-
tional reforms that may be necessary to bring about changes in the 
approaches of state courts. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Many state courts, in interpreting state constitutions, use 
separation of powers to limit delegation and expand the power of the 
legislature to control agency rulemaking in a manner consistent with 
Antifederalist political science. The approach of such states differs 
starkly from that of federal courts, which have interpreted separation 
of powers to favor delegation to administrative agencies and to limit 
legislative oversight in a manner consistent with Federalist separa-
tion of powers principles. Yet state courts rarely provide discussion of 
or reference to these differing principles, nor do they provide adequate 
rationales for adherence to a distinct state approach. 
The state approach can be critiqued through the normative 
lens of Federalist separation of powers principles. While this may 
appease those who agree with the prodelegation position and its Fed-
350. Cf. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitu-
tional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978). 
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eralist framework, the superimposition of federal separation of pow-
ers jurisprudence onto the states ignores the value of independent 
state interpretations of state constitutions, a key tenet of the new 
judicial federalism.351 The results alone of federal courts are of lim-
ited help to state courts as they address the particular problems their 
own systems of governance face, although state courts might find 
analogies in the reasoning approach of many federal decisions ad-
dressing similar separation of powers issues. 
At the same time, other theories of constitutional interpreta-
tion, such as textual and character-based arguments, are also of little 
value in reconciling the cases or in making sense of the approaches of 
state courts. As I have argued, attention to institutional design-
examining the particular governance institutions of a given state and 
how these institutions effect the operation of agency governance-can 
provide some explanation for many state court approaches to 
separation of powers issues affecting administrative agencies, 
particularly where these approaches diverge from federal case law. It 
has not been my intent to justify or explain state decisions that have 
little support in a serious analysis of institutions and their operation. 
Many state courts reject or follow the federal approach to separation 
of powers issues with little more than textual and doctrinal analysis. 
In interpreting their constitutions, state courts should make efforts to 
recognize and explain key institutional features of state governance 
that differ from the federal system, and to take seriously institutional 
differences between the states. This can help states in identifying the 
basis for adherence to distinct separation of powers principles and in 
gauging the ability of their system of governance to achieve Antifed-
eralist principles. 
State constitutional law has been described by James Gardner 
as a "vast wasteland of confusing, conflicting, and essentially unintel-
ligible pronouncements."352 Writing over 40 years ago, Kenneth Culp 
Davis, then an authority in the laws governing the growing adminis-
trative state, wrote of state courts considering the nondelegation 
issue, "the typical opinion strings together some misleading legal 
351. For more discussion on the values of independent state interpretation of constitutions, 
see James D. Heiple & Kraig James Powell, Presumed Innocent: The Legitimacy of Independent 
State Constitutional Interpretation, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1507 (1998). See also Rodriguez, supra note 
9; Robert F. Utter, State Constitutional Law, The United States Supreme Court, and Democratic 
Accountability: Is There a Crocodile in the Bathtub?, 64 WASH. L. REV. 19, 46-47 (1989); Robert 
F. Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme Court 
Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REV. 353 (1984). 
352. James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 
761, 763 (1992). 
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cliches and announces the conclusion."353 While I believe that 
Gardner and Davis may be correct in their description of state judicial 
reasoning in the separation of powers context, unlike Gardner I do not 
believe that the development of a unique state constitutional ap-
proach in the separation of powers context would be mistaken. Per-
haps state courts have made a mistake in continuing the legacy of 
Antifederalist separation of powers ideals, to the extent they do so. 
However, in this Article I suggest that institutional design may have 
sustained the Antifederalist legacy in some states. Discussion of 
institutional features affecting doctrine may assist state courts in 
salvaging their interpretive approach to separation of powers in the 
administrative rulemaking context. At the same time, though, I do 
not believe that differences in state systems of governance always 
outweigh their similarities with the federal system. If state courts 
are not able to legitimately salvage their interpretive approach, the 
Antifederalist bias of their separation of powers jurisprudence-and its 
concomitant anti-delegation approach to agency rulemaking-should 
be reassessed. 
353. 1 DAVIS, supra note 44, § 2.07 at 102. 
